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0. Introduction 
0.1. Some Explanation 
This treatise is written on an elementary level; in more difficult 
cases the final formulas are provided without proof. Nevertheless, 
it was impossible to leave out integrals and I also had to 
differentiate an integral with respect to a parameter. I include many 
examples taken from the history of probability and hope that my 
subject has thus become lively. I especially quote Karl Pearson’s 
(1978, p. 1) repentant confession: 
I do feel how wrongful it was to work for so many years at 
statistics and neglect its history. 
In spite of a few mistakes, his book deserves serious attention. 
Thus, in § 4.1.1 I criticize his opinion about Jakob Bernoulli. 
I have devoted much attention to the notion of probability which 
fully conforms to Langevin’s statement (1913/1914, p. 3): 
    Dans toutes ces questions [in the kinetic theory] la difficulté 
principale est, comme nous le verrons, de donner une définition 
correcte et claire de la probabilité. 
    Note however that correct definition sounds strangely.  
0.2. The Object of the Theory of Probability 
    Toss a coin and the outcome will be either heads or tails. Toss it 50 
times and theoretically there will be 0, 1, 2, …, 49 or 50 heads. For the 
time being I emphasize that the number of heads will only be 
determined stochastically (= probabilistically): there will be from 20 to 
30 heads with such-and-such probability; from 22 to 28 heads with 
another probability etc. In probability theory, it will never be possible 
to provide a quite definite answer whereas, for example, the number of 
roots of a given algebraic equation can be stated at once. 
    Games of chance (of which coin tossing is an example) was the 
main subject of the early theory of probability. Their outcome depends 
on chance rather than on the gamblers’ skill, and even now they are 
methodically (and therefore pedagogically as well) interesting.  
Many tosses provide an example of mass random events which 
occur in most various settings: in population statistics (births, 
marriages, deaths), when treating numerous observations corrupted by 
unavoidable random errors, applying acceptance sampling of 
manufactured articles with a stochastic estimation of its error, and in 
various branches of knowledge (kinetic theory, epidemiology etc). 
And so, the theory of probability studies mass random events, or, more 
precisely, their regularities which really exist. An isolated event is 
random, but a (homogeneous) set of events displays regularities. 
Aristotle (Metaphysics 1026b) remarked that none of the traditional 
sciences busies itself about the accidental. As stated above, neither 
does the theory of probability!  
Laplace quite successfully applied probability to studying mass 
random events, and thus to investigating laws of nature (especially 
astronomy) and population statistics. And unlike his predecessors, he 
regarded the theory of probability as a branch of applied mathematics 
(and separated himself from the geometers: let the geometers study …). 
I ought to add the reasonable but indefinite Laplace’s opinion 
(1814/1886, p. CLIII): La théorie des probabilités n’est, au fond, que 
le bon sens réduit au calcul. He did not mention mass random events 
and furthermore his definition pertained to mathematics of his time as 
a whole. 
Times change and we change with time … A mathematically 
formulated definition of the aims of the theory of probability became 
needed, and Boole (1851/1952, p. 251) provided it, in a seemingly dull 
wording: Given the separate probabilities of any [logical] proposition, 
to find the probability of another proposition. A similar statement 
pertaining to events was due to Chebyshev (1845/1951, p. 29): the 
theory of probability has as its subject the determination of an event 
given its connection with events whose probabilities are given. He 
added that probability signifies some magnitude subject to 
measurement. Prokhorov & Sevastianov (1999, p. 77) confirmed that 
aim and noted that such determinations were possible owing to the 
stability of those same mass random phenomena, as they stated. 
Anyway, owing to the stability of statistical probability (§ 1.1.3). 
Since the theory of probability is axiomatized, it belongs to pure 
mathematics rather than a branch of applied mathematics (Laplace, see 
above).  
 
Chapter 1. Main Notions, Theorems and Formulas 
1.1. Probability 
    1.1.1. Theoretical Probability. Suppose that the outcome of a trial 
depends on n incompatible and equally possible cases only m of which 
are favourable for the appearance of some event A. Then its probability 
is assumed as 
 
    P(A) = m/n                                                                (1.1) 
 
and it can change from 0 to 1, from an impossible to a certain event. 
This is the so-called classical definition due (not to Laplace, but) to De 
Moivre (1711/1984, p. 237) although he formulated it in the language 
of chances as he also did later, in 1756.  
    That definition had been known or intuitively applied from antiquity. 
The Talmud recognized seven levels of food containing differing 
relative amounts of a prohibited element (Rabinovitch 1973, p. 41). In 
the 14
th
 century, Oresme (1966, p. 247) possibly thought about 
probability in the modern way since he stated that two [randomly 
chosen] numbers were probably incommensurable. (For us, his 
understanding of incommensurability was unusual.) The same idea of 
probability is seen in Kepler (1596). Finally, I cite Jakob Bernoulli 
(1713, Chapter 1 in Pt. 4). He introduced probability just as De Moivre 
did but not formally, nor did he apply it in the sequel.  
In ancient times, geometry started by definitions of a point, a line 
and a plane. The point, for example, was something dimensionless. 
Nowadays, such negative definitions are unacceptable; just consider: a 
man is not a woman … and a woman is not a man! We have to accept 
such initial notions without defining them. Here is Markov (1900; 
1908, p. 2; 1924, p. 2; and 1911/1981, p. 149): 
Various concepts are defined not by words, each of which can in 
turn demand definition, but rather by [our] attitude towards them 
ascertained little by little. 
  
    I shall not defend these basic theorems linked to the basic notions of 
the calculus of probability, notions of equal probability, of 
independence of events, and so on, since I know that one can argue 
endlessly about the basic principles even of such a precise science as 
geometry.  
    Then, Kamke (1933, p. 14) noted: Um das Jahr 1910 konnte man in 
Göttingen das Bonmot hören:  
    Die mathematische Wahrscheinlichkeit ist ein Zahl, die zwischen 
Null und Eins liegt und über die man sonst nicht weis. 
    At that tine, Göttingen was considered the mathematical world 
centre, but in 1934 Hilbert, who had been working there, stated that 
after the Jewish scholars were ousted, the university ceased to exist. 
Not without reason Khinchin (1961/2004, p. 396) noted that  
    Each author […] invariably reasoned about equally possible and 
favourable chances, attempting, however, to leave this unpleasant 
subject as soon as possible. 
    Indeed, definition (1.1) begs the question: probability depends on 
equal possibilities, that is, on equal probabilities. More important, it is 
not really a definition, but only a formula for calculating it. Just the 
same, the area of a square can be calculated, but the appropriate 
formula does not tell us the meaning of area. And, finally, equal 
possibilities exist rarely so that the application of formula (1.1) is 
severely restricted. 
    In accord with Hilbert’s recommendation (1901, Problem No. 6), 
the contemporary theory of probability is axiomatic, but in practice 
statistical probability (see § 1.1.3) reigns supreme. 
    Example (application of theoretical probability). Apparently during 
1613 – 1623 Galileo wrote a note about a game with 3 dice first 
published in 1718 (David 1962, pp. 65 – 66; English translation, pp. 
192 – 195). He calculated the number of all the possible outcomes 
(therefore, indirectly, the appropriate probabilities) and compared the 
appearance of 9 or 12 points and 10 or 11 points (events A and B). 
Both A and B occurred in six ways; thus, A can appear when the 
number of points on the dice is (3, 3, 3) or (1, 4, 4 or 2, 2, 5) or (1, 2, 6 
or 1, 3, 5 or 2, 3, 4), i. e. when the number of points on each die is the 
same; when it is only the same on two dice; and when it is different. 
However, the first case is realized only once, the second case, in 3 
ways, and the last one, in 6 ways. Event A therefore appears in 25 
ways whereas event B, according to similar considerations, in 27 ways. 
The total number of possible outcomes is 216, 108 for 3, 4, …, or 10 
points, and again 108 for 11, 12, …, 18 points and the probabilities of 
A and B are 25/216 and 27/216. 
    This example is instructive: it shows that the cases in formula (1.1) 
if unequally likely can be subdivided into equally possible ones. 
Galileo also stated that gamblers knew that B was more advantageous 
than A. They could have empirically compared not 25/216 and 27/216, 
but 25/52 and 27/52 by only paying attention to the two studied events.  
    Some definitions. When two events, A and B, have occurred, we say 
that their product AB had appeared. When at least one of them has 
occurred, it was the appearance of their sum, (A + B), and if only one 
(say, A but not B), then it was their difference (A – B).  
    Example. Two chess tournaments are to be held. The probabilities of 
a certain future participant to win the first place (events A and B) are 
somehow known. If the tournaments will occur at the same time, the 
product AB is senseless, formula (1.1) cannot be applied, the 
probability of that product does not exist. 
    1.1.1.-1. The addition theorem. For incompatible events A and B  
 
    P(A + B) = P(A) + P(B). 
 
    Examples. Suppose that an urn contains n balls, a of them red, b, 
blue, and c, white. Required is the probability of drawing a coloured 
ball (Rumshitsky 1966). The answer is obviously a/n + b/n.  
    Here, however, is only a seemingly similar problem. A die is rolled 
twice. Required is the probability that one six will appear. Call the 
occurrence of 6 points in the first and the second trial by A and B. 
Then 
 
    P(A) = 1/6, P(B) = 1/6, P(A + B) = 1/3. 
 
    But something is wrong! After 6 trials the probability will be unity, 
and in 7 trials?.. The point is, that A and B are not incompatible. See 
the correct solution in § 1.1.1-2. 
    The addition and the multiplication (see below) theorems for 
intuitively understood probabilities have actually been applied even in 
antiquity. Aristotle (De Caelo 292a30 and 289b22) stated that 
    Ten thousand Coan throws [whatever that meant] in succession with 
the dice are impossible and it is therefore difficult to conceive that the 
pace of each star should be exactly proportioned to the size of its 
circle.  
Imagined games of chance had illustrated impossible events: the 
stars do not rotate around the sky randomly. Note that the naked eye 
sees about six thousand stars. 
    1.1.1-2. Generalization: the formula of inclusion and exclusion. For 
two events A and B the general addition formula is 
 
    P(A + B) = P(A) + P(B) – P(AB).  
 
    Indeed, in the example in § 1.1.1-1 P(AB) = 1/36 and 
 
    P(A + B) = 1/6 + 1/6 – 1/36 = 11/36. 
 
The number of favourable cases was there 11 rather than 12. For 3 
events we have 
 
P(A + B + C) = P(A) + P(B) + P(C) – P(AB) – P(AC) – P(BC) + P(ABC) 
 
and in the general case 
 
    Р(А1А2 … Аn) = Р( ) ( ) ( ) ...i i j i j k
i i j i j k
A P A A Р A A A
  
      
 
This formula of inclusion and exclusion was applied by Montmort (1708). 
It is a particular case of the proposition about the mutual arrangement of 
arbitrary sets. The conditions i < j, i < j < k, … ensure the inclusion of 
all subscripts without repetition. Thus, for 4 events i < j means that 
allowed are events with subscripts 1, 2; 1, 3; 1, 4; 2, 3; 2, 4 and 3, 4, 
six combinations in all (of 4 elements taken 2 at a time). 
1.1.1-3. The multiplication theorem. We introduce notation Р(В/А), 
denoting the probability of event В given that event А had occurred. 
Now, the theorem: 
 
    Р(АВ) = Р(А)Р(В/А).                                                        (1.2) 
 
Switch А with В, then  
 
    Р(АВ) = Р(В)Р(А/В).                                                       (1.3) 
 
Example 1 (Rumshitsky 1966). There are 4% defective articles in a 
batch; among the others 75% are of the best quality. Required is the 
probability that a randomly chosen article will be of the best quality. 
Denote the extraction of a standard article by А, and by В, of one of 
the best. Then 
 
    Р(А) = 1 – 0.04 = 0.96; Р(В/А) = 0.75. Р(АВ) = 0.96∙0.75 = 0.72. 
 
Example 2. What number of points, 11 or 12, will occur more 
probably in a cast of two dice? Leibniz (Todhunter 1865, p. 48) thought 
that both outcomes were equally probable since each was realized in only 
one way, when casting 5 and 6 and 6 and 6 respectively. An elementary 
mistake committed by a great man! Denote by A and B the occurrence of 5 
and 6 on a die, then Р(А) = 1/6, Р(В) = 1/6. Yes, both outcomes after 
casting both dice are the same, Р(АВ) = Р(А)Р(В) = 1/36, but we ought 
to take into account that the first alternative can appear in two ways, 5 
and 6, and 6 and 5, and is therefore twice as probable. 
In general, if Р(В/А) = Р(В) the multiplication theorem is written as  
 
    Р(АВ) = Р(А)Р(В), 
 
and the events А and В are called independent. 
Example 3. А and В have 12 counters each and play with 3 dice. 
When 11 points appear, А gives В a counter and В gives a counter to А 
when 14 points occur. Required are the gamblers’ chances of winning 
all the counters. This is Additional problem No. 5 formulated by 
Pascal, then by Huygens (1657), who provided the answer without 
solution.  
There are 216 outcomes of a cast of 3 dies, 15 of them favouring the 
appearance of 14 points, and 27 favouring 11 points, see Example in § 
1.1.1. The probabilities or chances of winning are therefore as 15/27 = 
5/9. For winning 12 counters the chances therefore are as 5
12
/9
12
. 
This was the first of a series of problems describing the gambler’s 
ruin. They proved extremely interesting and among their investigators 
were De Moivre and Laplace. In a particular case, the fortune of one of 
the gamblers was supposed to be infinite.  
A series of games of chance can be thought of as a random walk 
whereas, when considered in a generalized sense, they become a 
random process (§ 5.2).  
    Suppose now that more than 2 (for example, 4) events are studied. 
The multiplication theorem will then be generalized: 
 
    Р(А1А2А3А4) = Р(А1)Р(А2/А1)Р(А3/А1А2)Р(А4/А1А2А3). 
 
The last multiplier, for example, denotes the probability of event А4  
given that all the other events had happened.  
    Reader! Bear with me for some time yet; two more statements are 
needed, perhaps not very elegant (every man to his taste). 
1.1.1-4. A more essential generalization of the multiplication 
theorem. Suppose that event А can occur with one and only one of 
several incompatible events В1, В2, …, Вn. It follows that our notation 
Р(АВ) can now be replaced simply by Р(А), so that formula (1.3) will 
be 
 
    Р(А) = Р(В1) Р(А/В1) + Р(В2) Р(А/В2) + … + Р(Вn) Р(А/Вn) = 
 
    
1
( ) ( / )
n
i i
i
P B P A B

 .                                                       (1.4) 
 
This is the formula of total probability and the Вi’s may be 
considered the causes of the occurrence of А, each leading to A 
although only with its own probability.  
Suppose that 3 urns have, respectively, 1 white (w) and 2 black (b) 
balls; 2 w and 1 b ball; and 3 w and 5 b balls. An urn is randomly 
selected and a ball is drawn from it. Required is the probability that 
that ball is white.  
The probabilities of extracting a white ball from those urns are 
Р(А/Вi) = 1/3, 2/3 и 3/8, and the probability of selecting any urn is the 
same, Р(Вi) = 1/3. Therefore,  
 
    Р(А) = (1/3)·(1/3) + (1/3)·(2/3) + (1/3)·(3/8) = 0.458 < 1. 
 
It is quite possible that the extracted ball was black. But can  
Р(А) > 1? Let 
 
Р(А/В1) = Р(А/В2) = Р(А/В3) = 0.99 
  
and of course 
 
    Р(В1) + Р(В2) + Р(В3) = 1. 
 
    But the feared event will not occur even when the first 3 
probabilities are so high. But can Р(А) = 1? 
1.1.1-5. The Bayes formula. The left sides of equations (1.2) and 
(1.3) coincide, and their right sides are equal to each other 
 
    Р(А)Р(В/А) = Р(В)Р(А/В), 
 
or, in previous notation, 
 
    Р(А)Р(Вi/А) = Р(Вi)Р(А/Вi), 
 
    
( ) ( / )
( / ) .
( )
i i
i
P B P A B
P B A
P A
                                        (1.5) 
 
    Replace finally Р(А) according to formula (1.4): 
 
    
1
( ) ( / )
( / ) .
( ) ( / )
i i
i n
i i
i
P B P A B
P B A
P B P A B



                                   (1.6) 
 
It is time to contemplate. We assigned probabilities Р(В1), Р(В2), …, 
Р(Вn) to causes В1, В2, …, Вn and they are in the right side of (1.6). 
But they are prior whereas the trial was made: the event А has 
occurred and those prior probabilities can now be corrected, replaced 
by posterior probabilities Р(В1/А), Р(В2/А), …, Р(Вn/А).  
Bayes (1764) included formula (1.6) but only in the particular case 
of n = 1 (which means going back to the previous formula). However, 
it is traditionally called after him. More precisely, from 1830 onwards 
it was formula (4.5) that was called after him. Nevertheless, Cournot 
(1843, § 88), although hesitantly, attributed formula (1.6) to Bayes; 
actually, it appeared in Laplace’s great treatise (1812, § 26). 
And who was Bayes? A talented mathematician. His posthumous 
memoir (1764 – 1765) became lively discussed in the early 20th 
century since prior probabilities were rarely known; is it possible to 
suppose that they are equal to each other? Laplace (1814/1995, p. 116) 
thought that hypotheses should be created without attributing them any 
reality and continually corrected by new observations. Discussions are 
still continuing and anyway many terms are called after Bayes, for 
example, Bayesian approach, estimator etc. 
Example. Consider the same three urns as above. For them, the 
fractions in the right side of formula (1.5) differ one from another only 
by multipliers Р(А/Вi), which are to each other as (1/3):(2/3):(3/8) = 
8:16:9. The same can therefore be stated about the posterior 
probabilities Р(Вi/А). It is certainly possible to take into consideration 
the previously established value Р(А) = 0. 458 and calculate them: 
 
1  2 3
1 2 3
( / ) ,  ( / ) ,  ( / ) . 
3 3 0.458 3 3 0.458 3 8 0.458
P B A P B A P B A  
     
 
 
Understandably, probability Р(В2/А) turned out as the highest of 
them: the relative number of white balls was largest in that same urn, 
the second one. 
Stigler (1983/1999) applied the Bayes theorem in the mentioned 
particular case for stating that another English mathematician, 
Saunderson, was the real author of the Bayes memoir. He (p. 300) 
assigned subjective probabilities to three differing assumptions (for 
example, did each of them, Bayes and Saunderson, keep in touch with 
De Moivre) and multiplied these probabilities for each of the two. 
Their ratio occurred to be 3:1 in favour of the latter. Tacitly allowing 
an equality of the corresponding prior probabilities, Stigler (p. 301) 
decided that the probability of Saunderson’s authorship was three 
times higher. Stigler’s tacit assumption was absolutely inadmissible 
and that his (happily forgotten) conclusion ought to be resolutely 
rejected. That same Stigler allowed himself to vomit an abuse on Euler 
(§ 6.2) and Gauss (Sheynin 1999a, pp. 463 – 466). 
1.1.1-6. Subjective probability. It is naturally prior and somewhat 
complements the theoretical probability (1.1). Indirectly, it is applied 
very often, especially when there exists no reason to doubt the 
existence of equal probabilities of some outcomes. Thus, the 
probability of each outcome of a cast of a die is supposed to be 1/6, 
although any given die is not exactly regular. Poisson and Cournot 
(1843/1984, p. 6) were the first to mention it definitely. They even 
called it and the objective probability by different terms, chance and 
probability. 
    Here is Poisson’s (1837, § 11) instructive problem. An urn contains 
n white and black balls in an unknown proportion. Required is the 
probability that an extracted ball is white. The number of white balls 
can be 0, 1, 2, …, n, – (n + 1) allegedly equally probable cases. The 
probability sought is therefore the mean of all possible probabilities 
 
    
1 1 1 0 1
( ... ) = 
1 2
n n
n n n n n

   

 
 
as it should have been. His answer conforms to the principles of the 
information theory which Poisson himself understood perfectly well: it, 
his answer, corresponded to la perfaite perplexité de notre esprit.  
Poisson (1825 – 1826) applied subjective probability when 
investigating a game of chance. Cards are extracted one by one from 
six decks shuffled together as a single whole until the sum of the 
points in the sample obtained was in the interval [31; 40]. The sample 
is not returned and a second sample of the same kind is made. It is 
required to determine the probability that the sums of the points are 
equal. Like the gamblers and bankers, Poisson tacitly assumed that the 
second sample was extracted as though from the six initial fresh decks. 
Actually, this was wrong, but the gamblers thought that, since they did 
not know what happened to the initial decks, the probability of 
drawing some number of points did not change. 
When blackjack is played, bankers are duty bound to act the same 
wrong way: after each round the game continues without the used 
cards, and, to be on the safe side, they ought to stop at 17 points. A 
gambler endowed with a retentive memory can certainly profit from 
this restriction.  
Here are other examples. Redemption of the first born. The 
Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin 1
4
) describes how lots were taken. The 
main point was that the voters were afraid that there will be no more 
special ballots left freeing the last voters from the payment. They 
actually thought about the subjective probabilities of the distribution of 
those special ballots among consecutive voters. Tutubalin (1972, p. 12) 
considered the same problem in quite another setting and proved that 
the fears of the voters were unfounded. 
Another example. Rabinovitch (1973, p. 40) desribed the statement 
of Rabbi Shlomo ben Adret (1235 – 1310 or 1319) about eating some 
pieces of meat one of which was not kosher. One piece after another 
may be eaten because (actually) the probability of choosing the 
forbidden piece was low, and when only two pieces are left, – why, the 
forbidden piece was already eaten, so eat these two as well! 
    Subjective opinions are mathematically studied, for example those 
pertaining to expert estimates and systems of voting. In those cases the 
merits of the economic projects or candidates are arranged in 
ascending or descending order of preference, see § 5.1. 
1.1.2. Geometrical Probability. The classical definition of 
probability can be generalized, and, in a manuscript of 1664 – 1666, 
Newton (1967, pp. 58 – 61) was the first to do so. He considered a ball 
falling upon the centre of a circle divided into sectors whose areas 
were in such proportion as 2 to √5. If the ball tumbles into the first 
sector, a person gets a, otherwise he receives b, and his hopes is worth 
 
(2 5) (2 5).a b     
 
The probabilities of the ball tumbling into these sectors were as 2 to √5, 
as Newton also indirectly stated. See also Sheynin (1971a). 
The classical definition is still with us with m and n being real rather 
than only natural numbers. In this way many authors effectively 
applied geometrical probability. Buffon (1777, § 23) definitively 
introduced it by solving his celebrated problem. A needle of length 2r 
falls randomly on a set of parallel lines. Determine the probability P 
that it intersects one of them. It is easily seen that 
 
   P = 4r/πa 
 
where a > 2r is the distance between adjacent lines. Buffon himself 
had however only determined the ratio r/a for P = 1/2. His main aim 
was to mettre donc la Géométrie en possession de ses droits sur la 
science du hazard (Buffon 1777/1954, p. 471). Later authors 
generalized the Buffon problem, for example by replacing lines by 
rectangles or squares. 
Laplace (1812, chapter 5) noted that after, say, 100 such trials the 
number π can be calculated. He thus suggested the Monte Carlo 
method (of statistical simulation). A formal definition of the new 
concept was only due to Cournot (1843, § 18). More precisely, he 
offered a general definition for a discrete and a continuous random 
variable by stating that probability was the ratio of the étendue of the 
favourable cases to that of all the cases. We would now replace 
étendue by measure (in particular, by area). 
Actually, beginning with Nikolaus Bernoulli (1709/1975, pp. 296 – 
297), see also Todhunter (1865, pp. 195 – 196), each author dealing 
with continuous laws of distribution (§ 2.1) applied geometric 
probability. The same can be said about Boltzmann (1868/1909, p. 49) 
who defined the probability of a system being in a certain phase as the 
ratio of the time during which it is in that time to the whole time of the 
motion. Ergodic theorems can be mentioned, but they are beyond our 
boundaries.  
    Determine the probability that a random chord of a given circle is 
shorter than the side of an inscribed equilateral triangle (Bertrand 
1888). This celebrated problem had been discussed for more than a 
century and several versions of randomness were studied. Bertrand 
himself offered three different solutions, and it was finally found out 
that, first, there was an uncountable number of solutions, and, second, 
that the proper solution was probability equals 1/2 which corresponded 
to la perfaite perplexité de notre esprit (§ 1.1.1-6).  
Finally, the encounter problem (Laurent 1873, pp. 67 – 69): two 
persons are to meet at a definite spot during a specified time interval 
(say, an hour). Their arrivals are independent and occur at random; the 
first one to come waits only for a certain time (say, 20 minutes), then 
leaves. Required is the probability of a successive encounter. 
Denote the time of their arrivals by x and y, then |х – у| ≤ 20 or |у – 
х| ≤ 20, and a graphical solution is simple and instructive, see also § 
3.2. 
1.1.3. Statistical Probability. Suppose that a random event occurred 
μ times in ν trials. Then its relative frequency (frequency, as I will call 
it) or statistical probability is 
    pˆ  = μ/ν                                                                         (1.7) 
 
and it obviously changes from 0 to 1.  
    Newton (§ 1.1.2), while commenting on his second thought 
experiment, a roll of an irregular die, concluded that, nevertheless, It 
may be found how much one cast is more easily gotten then another. 
He likely had in mind statistical probabilities rather than analytic 
calculations. And he may well have seen Graunt’s pioneer statistical 
contribution of 1662 where all deductions pertaining to population and 
medical statistics had been based on statistical probabilities. 
Statistical probability was applied even by Celsus (1935, p. 19) in 
the first century of our era:  
Careful men noted what generally answered the better, and then 
began to prescribe the same for their patients. Thus sprang up the Art 
of medicine.  
He certainly had no numerical data at his disposal, but qualitative 
statements had been a distinctive feature of ancient science.  
The definition above is only meaningful if the trials are mutually 
independent and the calculated probability remains almost the same in 
a subsequent series of similar trials. If results of some trials essentially 
differ, say, from one day of the week to another, then each such day 
ought to be studied separately. And what kind of trials do we call 
independent? For the time being, we say: trials, whose results do not 
influence each other, also see § 1.1.1-3.  
The imperfection of the theoretical probability and its narrow field 
of applications led to the appearance of the statistical probability as the 
main initial notion (Richard Mises, in the 1920s).  
A rigorous implementation of his simple idea proved extremely 
difficult and discussions about the Mises’ frequentist theory never 
ended. Here is his idea. Toss a coin many times and from time to time 
calculate the frequency (1.7) of heads. After a sufficiently large ν it 
will only change within narrow bounds and at ν → ∞ it will reach 
some limiting value. It was this value that Mises called statistical 
probability (of heads). 
Infinitely long trials are impossible, but Mises cited a similar 
approach in physics and mechanics (for example, velocity at a given 
moment). He also stated that the sequence of the trials (the collective) 
should be irregular (so that its infinite subsequences should lead to the 
same probability pˆ ). 
This condition is too indefinite. How many subsequences ought to 
be tested before irregularity is confirmed? And is it impossible to 
select randomly an excessively peculiar subsequence? Even these 
superficial remarks show the great difficulties encountered by the 
frequentist theory; nevertheless, naturalists have to issue from 
statistical probability. 
Yes, it is theoretically imperfect, although mathematicians came to 
regard it somewhat milder (Kolmogorov 1963, p. 369). I ought to add 
that (Uspensky et al 1990, § 1.3.4)  
Until now, it proved impossible to embody Mises’ intention in a 
definition of randomness satisfactory from any point of view.  
1.1.4. Independence of Events and Observations. Events А and В are 
independent if (1.1.1-3) 
 
Р(АВ) = Р(А)Р(В),  
 
otherwise 
 
    Р(АВ) = Р(А)Р(В/А). 
 
   Switch А and B, then 
 
    Р(АВ) = Р(В)Р(А/В).  
 
A remarkable corollary follows: if А does not depend on В, then В 
does not depend on А; independence is mutual (De Moivre (1718/1756, 
p. 6): 
Two events are independent, when they have no connection one with 
the other, and that the happening of one neither forwards nor 
obstructs the happening of the other. 
Two events are dependent, when they are so connected together as 
that the probability of either’s happening is altered by the happening 
of the other.  
The proof of mutuality of independence (already evident in that 
definition) is simple. According to the condition, Р(А/В) = Р(А), then 
by formulas (1.3) and (1.2)  
 
    Р(АВ) = Р(В)Р(А), Р(В/А) = Р(В), QED. 
 
Here, however, is a seemingly contradicting example. Suppose that the 
weather during a summer week in some town is random. Then the 
random sales of soft drinks there depend on it although there simply 
cannot be any inverse dependence. But weather and sales cannot be 
here considered on the same footing. 
    De Moivre (1711, Introduction) was the first to mention 
independence, see also just above. Later classics of probability theory 
mentioned independence of events as well (see below), but some 
authors forgot about it. The situation had abruptly changed since 
Markov investigated his chains (§ 5.2) and thus added an additional 
direction to the theory, the study of dependent random events and 
variables. 
Gauss (1823, § 18) stated that if some observation was common to 
two functions of the results of observations, the errors of these latter 
will not be independent from each other. He added (for some reason, 
only in § 19) that those functions were linear. Without this restriction 
his statement would have contradicted the Student – Fisher theorem 
about the independence of the sample mean and variance in case of the 
normal distribution. 
Also dependent, as Gauss (1828, § 3) thought, were the results of 
adjustments. Thus, after the observed angles of a triangle were 
corrected, and their sum became strictly equal to its theoretical value, 
these adjusted angles were not anymore independent; they are now 
somehow connected by their unavoidable residual errors. Note that 
Gauss had thus considered independence of functions of random 
variables (§ 1.2.3). 
Geodesists invariably (and without citing Gauss) kept to the same 
definition. Thus, in the Soviet Union separate chains of triangulation 
had bases and astronomically determined directions on both ends. 
Therefore, after their preliminary adjustment they were included in a 
general adjustment as independent entities. True, the bases and those 
directions were common to at least two chains, but they were 
measured more precisely than the angles. 
Bernstein (1946, p. 47) offered an instructive example showing that 
pairwise independence of, say, three events, is not sufficient for their 
mutual independence. 
1.2. Randomness and Random Variables 
    1.2.1. Randomness. In antiquity, randomness was a philosophical 
notion, then became a mathematical concept as well. Aristotle 
included it in his doctrine of causes; here are two of his celebrated 
examples. 
1) Digging a hole for a tree, someone finds a buried treasure [not a 
rusty nail!] (Metaphysics 1025а). 
2) Two men known to each other meet suddenly (Physics 196b30); 
two independent chains of events suddenly intersected.  
These examples have a common feature: a small change in the 
action(s) of those involved led to an essential change: the treasure 
would have remained buried, there would have been no meeting. Many 
ancient authors imagined chance just as Aristotle did whereas Cournot 
(1843, § 40) mentioned the second example anew.  
The pattern small change – essential consequences became 
Poincaré’s (1896/1987, pp. 4 – 6) main explanation of randomness, 
although he specified: when equilibrium is unstable. Here is his or, 
rather, Cournot’s (1843, § 43) example: a right circular cone standing 
vertically on its vertex falls in a random direction. A similar example 
is due to Galen (1951, p. 202), a Roman physician and naturalist, 2
nd
 
century:  
In those who are healthy […] the body does not alter even from 
extreme causes; but in old men even the smallest causes produce the 
greatest change.  
    Corruption of nature’s aims was another cause of randomness. 
Kepler (1618 – 1621/1952, p. 932) established that planets move along 
elliptical orbits whereas nature, as he thought, aimed at circular orbits. 
Complete perfection was not attained. Only Newton proved that the 
ellipticity followed from his law of universal gravitation and that the 
eccentricity of an orbit was determined by the planet’s initial velocity. 
Following Kepler and Kant, Laplace (1796/1884, p. 504) somehow 
concluded that these eccentricities had been caused by variations of 
temperatures and densities of the diverse parts of the planets. 
A mathematical theory cannot however be based on encounters or 
nature’s aims. I leave aside very interesting but occurring much ahead 
of their time and therefore unsuccessful attempts mathematically to 
determine randomness (Lambert 1771, §§ 323 – 324; 1772 – 1775), 
see also Sheynin (1971b, pp. 245 – 246). Modern attempts deal with 
infinite (and even finite) sequences of zeros and unities such as 
 
    0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, … 
 
    Is it random or not? Such questions proved fundamental. They were 
approached in various ways, but are far from being solved. For a finite 
sequence that question is still more complicated. In any case, the 
beginning of an infinite sequence ought to be irregular so that 
irregularity (as Mises also thought) is an essential property of 
randomness. 
In philosophy, randomness is opposed to necessity; in natural 
sciences Poincaré (1896/1912, p. 1) described their dialectic: 
Dans chaque domaine, les lois précises ne décidaient pas de tout, 
elles traҫaient seulement les limites entre lesquelles il était permis au 
hasard de se mouvoir. 
He did not regrettably mention regularities of mass random events. 
It is also appropriate to recall the celebrated Laplace’s (1814/1995, p. 
2) statement allegedly proving that he rejected randomness: 
An intelligence that, at a given instant, could comprehend all the 
forces by which nature is animated […], if, moreover, it were vast 
enough to submit these data to analysis, would encompass […] the 
movements of the greatest bodies and those of the slightest atoms. […] 
Nothing would be uncertain, and the future, like the past, would be 
open to its eyes.  
Such intelligence is impossible. Then, there exist unstable motions, 
responding to small errors of the initial conditions (see above) and 
perhaps half a century ago a mighty generalization of the former 
phenomenon, the chaotic motion, was discovered and acknowledged. 
Finally, Maupertuis (1756, p. 300) and Boscovich (1758, § 385) kept 
to the same Laplacean determinism.  
    Allegedly proving … Perhaps Laplace’s entire astronomical 
investigations and certainly all his statistical work refute his statements 
(which really took place) denying randomness.  
    1.2.2. Cause or Chance? What should we think if a coin falls on the 
same side 10 or 20 times in succession? Common sense will tell us: 
the coin was imperfect. Nevertheless, we will discuss this example. 
Indeed, after the appearance, in mid-19
th
 century, of the non-Euclidean 
geometry we may only trust common sense in the first approximation.  
Denote heads and tails by + and –. After two tosses the outcomes 
can be + +, + –, – + and – –, all of them equally probable. After the 
third toss the outcome + + becomes either + + +, or + + –. In other 
words, the outcome + + + is not less probable than any of the other 7, 
and it is easy to see that a similar conclusion remains valid at any 
number of tosses. Of course 10 heads in succession are unlikely, but 
all the other possible outcomes will be just as unlikely.  
So let us refer to Laplace (1776, p. 152; 1814/1995, p. 9), who 
discussed the so-called D’Alembert – Laplace problem: 
Suppose we laid out […] the printer’s letters Constantinople in this 
order. We believe that this arrangement is not due to chance, not 
because it is less possible than other arrangements. […] [S]ince we 
use this word it is incomparably more probable that someone has 
arranged the preceding letters in this order than that this arrangement 
happened by chance. 
    No formulas can help us and Laplace had to turn to common sense. 
In our example, we may conclude that someone had done something 
so that the coin always falls on the same side. Common sense did not 
let us down. In 1776, Laplace selected the word Infinitesimal; it was 
D’Alembert (1767, pp. 245 – 255) who wrote Constantinople. His 
considerations were not as reasonable.  
In general, the cause or chance problem compels us to separate 
somehow equally possible cases (if they exist) into ordinary and 
remarkable; Constantinople was indeed a remarkable arrangement. 
Kepler was an astrologer as well (and called himself the founder of an 
allegedly scientific astrology which only admitted a correlative 
influence of the stars on human beings). He (1601, § 40/1979, p. 97) 
added three aspects (remarkable mutual positions of the heavenly 
bodies) to the five recognized by the ancients and he (1604/1977, p. 
337) also was not willing to ascribe the appearance of a New star to 
blind chance […] and considered it a great wonder.  
Another related subject is the superstition and self-delusion peculiar 
to gamblers (and not only to them). A ball is rolled along a roulette 
wheel and stops with equal probability at any of the 37 positions 0, 
1, …, 35, 36. Gamblers attempt to guess where exactly will the ball 
stop and the winner gets all the stakes; however, if the ball stops at 0, 
the stakes go the banker. This is the simplest version of the game. 
Now suppose that the ball stopped at 18 three times in succession; 
should a gambler take this fact into account (and how exactly)?  
    Petty (1662/1899, vol. 1, p. 64) resolutely opposed games in chance 
(considered that playing as such was a superstition): A lottery […] is 
properly a tax upon unfortunate self-conceited fools. Montmort 
(1708/1980, p. 6) and other authors noted the gamblers’ superstitions; 
and here is Laplace (1814/1995, p. 92) commenting on a similar event:  
    When one number has not been drawn for a long time […], the mob 
is eager to bet on it.  
    But it was Bertrand (1888, p. XXII) who dealt the final blow 
(although did not convince the gamblers): Elle [the roulette] n’a ni 
conscience ni mémoire. Play, but do not retrieve your losses (a 
Russian saying)! It means: play if you cannot abstain from gambling, 
but never risk much. Arnauld & Nicole (1662/1992, p. 332) warned 
against expecting large gains (and risking much!). 
Laplace (Ibidem, p. 93) also mentioned the general public’ 
superstitions:  
I have seen men, ardently longing for a son […]. They fancied that 
the boys already born [during a certain month] made it more probable 
that girls would be born next. 
Finally, I note that Laplace (p. 93) saw no advantage in repeatedly 
staking on the same number. This brings us to martingales, but I will 
not go thus far. 
    1.2.3. Random Variable. This is the central notion of the theory of 
probability. Here is the simplest definition of a discrete random 
variable: A variable taking various discrete values, each with some 
probability. Denote these values by х1, х2, …, хn. The sum of their 
probabilities р1, р2, …, рn should be unity. Considered together, those 
values and probabilities are the random variable’s law of distribution. 
A random event can be understood as a random variable having n = 2. 
The case of n → ∞ is also possible; it can be realized in the discrete 
way, for example, if х1 = 1, х2 = 2, х3 = 3, …, with a countable number 
of the values, or, if a continuous random variable is considered, that 
number is uncountable. Example: all the uncountable values in interval 
[0; 1]. A new circumstance appears when there are infinitely many 
values: an event having a zero probability is possible. Indeed, select 
any point, say, in the appropriate interval. The probability of choosing 
any given point is certainly zero, but we did select some point! The 
geometric probability (§ 1.1.2) can be recalled here. 
A random variable (or its generalization, which we will not discuss) 
or a random event ought to be present in each problem of the theory of 
probability. Thus, the outcome of a dice-fall is a random variable; it 
takes 6 values, each with its own probability (here, they are identical).  
Many interesting examples of random variables can be provided. 
Thus, in the beginning of the 17
th
 century the participants in the 
celebrated Genoese lottery could guess 1, 2, …, 5 numbers out of 90. 
The gains increased with those numbers, but the more did the gambler 
hope for, the heavier was he punished (his expected gain rapidly 
decreased). This did not follow from any mathematical theorem, but 
was caused by the organizers’ greed.  
The random variable involved (the random gain) had 5 values with 
definite probabilities although only a handful of people had been able 
to calculate them. Then, from 1662 onward (Graunt), human lifespan 
began to be studied. In 1756 and 1757 Simpson effectively introduced 
random variables into the future theory of errors and until about the 
1930s this new direction of research had remained the main subject of 
probability theory. Simpson assumed that the chances of the (random) 
errors corrupting each measurement (of a given series) are represented 
by some numbers; the result of measurement thus became a possible 
value of some random variable and a similar statement held for all of 
them taken together. 
A formal introduction of the random variable was due to Poisson 
(1837, pp. 140 – 141 and 254) who still called it by a certainly 
provisional term chose A. The proper term, random variable, did not 
come into general use all at once. Perhaps its last opponent was 
Markov (letter to Chuprov of 1912; Ondar 1977/1981, p. 65): 
Everywhere possible, I exclude the completely undefined expression 
random and at random. Where it is necessary to use them, I introduce 
an explanation corresponding to the pertinent case. 
    He had not however devised anything better and often wrote 
indefinite magnitude, which was hardly better. Markov had not applied 
the terms normal distribution or correlation coefficient either! 
    In a certain sense, the entire development of the theory of 
probability consisted in an ever more general understanding of random 
variable. At first, randomness in general had been studied (actually, a 
random variable with a uniform law of distribution, see § 2.2.1) as 
contrary to necessity, then random variables having various 
distributions, dependent variables and random functions, cf. § 5.1. The 
level of abstraction in the theory gradually heightened (the same is true 
about the development of mathematics in general). It is well known 
that, the higher became that level (i. e., the further mathematics moved 
away from nature), the more useful it was. Complex numbers and 
functions of complex variables are absolutely alien to nature, but how 
useful they are in mathematics and its applications! 
 
Chapter 2. Laws of Distribution of Random Variables,  
Their Characteristics and Parameters 
2.1. Distribution Function and Density 
For describing a continuous random variable (call it ξ) we need to 
determine its law of distribution as it was done in § 1.2.3 for discrete 
variables. Denote by F(x) the probability of its being less than some х:  
 
    P(ξ < x) = F(x). 
 
This F(x) is called the distribution (integral) function of ξ. If ξ takes 
any value from – ∞ to ∞, then 
 
    P(ξ < – ∞) = F(– ∞) = 0, P(ξ < ∞) = F(∞) = 1. 
 
    Choose now two arbitrary points, х1 and х2, х2 > х1, then 
 
    P(ξ < х2) ≥ P(ξ < х1) or F(х2) ≥ F(х1). 
 
Indeed, Р(– ∞ < ξ < х2) cannot be lower than Р(– ∞ < ξ < х1). And if a 
random variable takes no values on interval [х1; х2] (but remains 
continuous beyond it), then  
 
    P(ξ < х2) = P(ξ < х1) or F(х2) = F(х1).                              (2.1) 
 
And so, in any case, the function F(х) does not decrease and if (2.1) 
does not take place, it increases. Note also that 
 
    F(х2) – F(х1) = P(ξ < х2) – P(ξ < х1).                                (2.2) 
 
Integral distribution functions began to be applied in the 20
th
 century, 
although they fleetingly appeared even in 1669. Pursuing a methodical 
aim, Huygens (1669/1895, between pp. 530 и 531) drew a graph of a 
function whose equation can be written as 
 
    y = 1 – F(x), 0 ≤ x ≤ 100.  
 
The curve described the human lifespan (ξ), the probability of Р(ξ ≥ 
х), but it was not based on numerical data. In 1725, De Moivre studied 
the same probability, and similarly Clausius (1858/1867, p. 268) 
investigated the probability of the free path of a molecule to be not less 
than х.  
    Until distribution functions really entered probability, continuous 
random variables had been described by densities φ(х) of their 
distributions (of their probability). Consider an infinitely short interval 
[х1; х1 + dx1]. A random variable takes there a value depending on х1; 
we may say, takes one and the same value φ(х1). On the adjacent 
interval of the same length on the right side the value of that variable  
may be assumed equal to φ(х2), х2 = х1 + dx1. Thus we get a series of 
values φ(х1), φ(х2), … and can describe the relation of this function, 
φ(х), the density, with F(x):  
 
    F(xn) = φ( ) ,
nx
x dx

  F(x1) = 
1
φ( ) ,
x
x dx

  F(xn) – F(x1) = 
1
φ( )
nx
x
x dx . 
     These formulas additionally explain equality (2.2). Strictly speaking,  
by definition, 
 
    F′(x) = φ(x),  
 
but the essence of φ(х) as stated above certainly holds. In more simple 
examples the density is a continuous function existing on a finite or 
infinite interval; according to its definition, the area under the density 
curve is unity.  
    Under, above, to the left or to the right are non-mathematical 
expressions, but we will apply them even without italics.  
    Instead of random variables themselves the theory of probability 
studies their distribution functions or densities just as trinomials  
 
    f(x) = ax
2
 + bx + c, а ≠ 0 
 
are studied in algebra. Given the parameters a, b and с, we can 
determine whether the roots of the trinomial are real (coinciding or not) 
or complex, can draw its graph. The same way we determine the 
behaviour of random variables. But where are the parameters of 
densities or distribution functions?  
Consider a function f(x). We may write it down as f(x; a; b; c) and 
thus show that its argument is the variable х, but that its behaviour is 
also determined by parameters constant for each given function (for 
each trinomial). The density and the distribution function also have 
parameters peculiar to each random variable. As a rule, statisticians 
estimate those parameters. Suppose that we have a continuous 
triangular distribution (assumptions of such kind should be justified) 
with an unknown parameter а (see § 2.2.2). It is required to estimate it, 
to establish for it some (sample) value ˆ,a  which is only possible when 
having appropriate observations of the random variable, and to 
determine the possible error of that estimate. If there are two 
parameters, certainly both should be estimated. 
2.2. Some Distributions 
2.2.1. The uniform distribution. A random variable having this 
distribution takes all its values with the same probability. Thus, all the 
6 outcomes of a die-fall are equally probable. A continuous random 
variable takes identical values on some interval. The area under this 
interval should be unity; for interval [– a, a] the density will therefore 
be  
 
    φ(х) = 1/а = Const 
 
and a can be considered the parameter of this distribution. 
2.2.2. The continuous triangular distribution is usually even. So let 
it cut the x-axis at points A (– a, 0) and C (a, 0). The density is the 
broken line ABC with AB and BC being the equal lateral sides of the 
isosceles triangle ABC. The area under it is unity, so we have B(0, 1/a).  
The only parameter of this distribution is obviously a since only it 
determines the coordinates of all the points A, B and C. I described the 
triangular distribution mostly since it was easy to establish the 
meaning of its parameter. It was introduced by Simpson (§ 1.2.3). 
2.2.3. The binomial distribution. We all remember the formula of 
the square of the sum of two numbers and some of us even managed to 
remember the formula for the cube of the same sum. However, there 
exists a general formula for natural exponents n = 1, 2, 3, …: 
 
    (p + q)
n 
= p
n
 + 1nC p
n–1
q + 2nC p
n–2
q
2
 + … + 1nnC
 pq
n–1
 + q
n
.  (2.3) 
 
We are only interested in the particular case of р + q = 1, that is, in 
those magnitudes which describe the probabilities of contrary events. 
Here, k
nC  is the number of combinations of n taken k at a time: 
 
    
 ( 1) ... ( 1)
,  .
!
k k n k
n n n
n n n k
C C C
k
     
 
The numerator has the same number of multipliers as the denominator. 
Thus, 
 
    35
5 4 3
,
3!
C
 
  3! = 1∙2∙3. 
 
Required now is the probability of casting a unity twice when 
rolling four dice (or rolling one die four times). Cast a die once, and 
the probability of a unity is р = 1/6, whereas the probability of all the 
other outcomes is q = 5/6. And now consider a binomial [(1/6) + (5/6)] 
raised to the fourth power:  
 
    [(1/6) + (5/6)]
4
 = [1/6
4](1 + 4∙13∙5 + 6∙12∙52 + 4∙1∙53 + 54). 
 
The term 6∙12∙52 will correspond to the probability sought since it, 
and only it, includes the multiplier 1
2
, denoting the studied outcome 
(and another outcome). That probability is 6[1/6
4
]∙12∙52 = 25/63 = 
25/216. We have thus taken into account the number (6) of the 
possible successive casts (the number of combinations of 4 elements 
taken 2 at a time). Neglecting this coefficient 6, we would have 
obtained the probability sought when the successful casts were fixed; 
for example, if the unity should have occurred in the first and the third 
roll.  
The number of trials n and the ratio p/q can be chosen as the 
parameters of the binomial distribution (2.3). It is not necessary to 
choose both p and q since only one of these magnitudes is independent 
(p + q = 1). The example above shows that each term of the binomial 
expansion (2.3) is the probability  
 
    р(x) = knC р
n–k 
q
k
, x = 0, 1, 2, …, n  
 
that the studied random event will occur k times in whichever n trials. 
The frequency is also essential, see § 2.4.1.  
    Interesting examples of the binomial distribution include the studies 
of the sex ratio at births, cf. § 4.2. Its generalization is the multinomial 
distribution with each trial concerning a random variable taking 
several values rather than a random event. It is therefore described by 
a multinomial  
 
    (a + b + c + …)n. 
 
Pertinent qualitative reasoning without mentioning probabilities 
were due to Maimonides (Rabinovitch 1973, с. 74): 
Among contingent things some are very likely, other possibilities are 
very remote, and yet others are intermediate. 
   2.2.4. The normal distribution. The function 
 
    
2
2
1 ( )
φ( ) exp[ ],
2σσ 2π
x a
x

   – ∞ < х < ∞,                       (2.4) 
 
is the density of the normal distribution. The stochastic meaning of the 
two of its parameters, а and ζ > 0, is described in § 2.4.2. The 
corresponding distribution function is 
 
    
2
2
1 ( )
( ) = exp[ ] .
2σσ 2π
z
x a
F z dx


  
 
Let а = 0 and ζ = 1, then, in the standard case,  
 
    
21
( ) = exp[ ] .
22π
z
x
F z dx

                                            (2.5) 
 
It is however more convenient to tabulate the function  
 
 
    
2
0
1
( ) = exp[ ] .
22π
z
x
F z dx                                           (2.6) 
 
    Indeed, the integrand in formula (2.5) is an even function so that the 
integrals (2.5) within (– ∞; 0] and [0; + ∞), are equal to each other and 
equal to 1/2; within, say, (– ∞; – 1] the integral (2.5) is equal to the 
difference between 1/2 and integral (2.6) at z = 1. The value of the 
function (2.6) at z ≈ 3 is already 0.499; if z → + ∞ its value is 1/2, or, 
which is the same, within infinite limits its value is unity, as it should 
be. 
The utmost importance of the normal distribution follows from the 
so-called central limit theorem (CLT), a term due to Polya (1920): 
The sum of a large number of independent random variables, each 
of them only to a small degree influencing that sum, is distributed 
normally. 
    It was Pearson, who, in 1893, definitively introduced the term 
normal distribution in order to avoid naming it after Gauss (1809) or 
Laplace who extensively applied it after non-rigorously proving 
several versions of the CLT. Galton applied that term before Pearson, 
but the first to suggest it was Peirce (1873, p. 206). 
    De Moivre (§ 4.2) considered the appearance of the normal law 
from a binomial distribution and thus proved a particular case of the 
CLT. Many authors not to mention Laplace had proved various 
versions of the CLT, but its rigorous proof was due to Markov and 
Liapunov, not even to Chebyshev. 
Denote the probabilities of a male and female births by р and q and 
neglect all the other possible births so that р + q = 1. Then the 
probabilities of some number of male births (or of this number 
remaining within some bounds) can be calculated by means of the 
normal distribution. This was indeed De Moivre’s immediate aim. 
From 1711 onward the parameter p/q became an object of numerous 
studies (§ 4.2).  
    About 1874 Galton (1877) invented the so-called quincunx, a device 
for visually demonstrating the appearance of the normal distribution as 
the limiting case of the uniform law. Shot was poured through several 
(say, 20) lines of pins, and each shot 20 times deviated with the same 
probability to the right or to the left and finally fell on the floor of the 
device. Thus appeared a normal curve. A special feature of that device 
was that it showed that the normal law was stable (§ 6.1). 
    2.2.5. The Poisson distribution. The law of this discrete distribution 
(Poisson 1837, p. 205) can be written down as 
 
    Р(х) = 
!
x
aa e
x
 , х = 0, 1, 2, … 
 
The sum of the probabilities Р(х) over all the infinite set of the values 
of х is 1, as it should be. Indeed, е–а is the common multiplier and 
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    Here is an interesting pattern leading to the Poisson distribution: 
points are entered on an interval according to a uniform distribution, 
one by one, independently from each other. It occurs that the number 
of points situated on some part of that interval obeys the Poisson 
distribution. Example: the number of calls entering an exchange. Its 
functioning can therefore be stochastically studied. 
Suppose an exchange serves 300 subscribers and the hourly 
probability of one of them speaking is р = 0.01. What will be the 
probability of four or more independent calls made during an hour? 
The conditions for the appearance of the Poisson distribution are met, 
and а = pn = 3. Then 
 
    P(ξ ≥ 4) = 
0 !
x
a
x
a
e
x



 – P(ξ = 0) – P(ξ = 1) – P(ξ = 2) – P(ξ = 3). 
 
    The sum is unity (see above) and the other terms are easily 
calculated. 
Another example: the distribution of the stars over the sky (Michell 
1767). If they are distributed uniformly (on a sphere rather than 
interval), some of them will be very close to each other (double, 
triple, … stars). Even then many such stars had been known, and 
Michell questioned whether this occurred randomly or not. What is the 
probability that two stars out of all of them are situated not more than 
1° apart? 
Newcomb (1860, pp. 427 – 429) applied the Poisson distribution to 
derive the probability that some small part of the celestial sphere 
contains s stars out of n uniformly distributed across the celestial 
sphere. In a sense, it is this distribution that best describes a random 
arrangement of many points. Its parameter is obviously a. 
    In 1898 Bortkiewicz introduced his law of small numbers, and for a 
few decades it had been considered as the main law of statistics. 
Actually, it only popularized the then yet little known Poisson 
distribution which is what Kolmogorov (1954) stated but did not 
justify his opinion and I (2008) proved that he was correct. 
Botkiewicz’s contribution is deservedly forgotten although mostly 
owing to previous more particular criticisms. 
    2.2.6. The hypergeometric distribution. It is important for 
acceptance inspection of mass production, see below. Consider the 
Additional problem No. 4 (Huygens 1657) first formulated by Pascal. 
Given, 12 counters, 4 of them white (as though defective). Required is 
the probability that 3 white counters occur among 7 counters drawn 
without replacement.  
Well, actually the entire batch should be rejected, but nevertheless I 
go ahead following Jakob Bernoulli (1713, part 3, problem 6), 
although applying the hypergeometric distribution. Huygens, it ought 
to be added, provided the answer, but not the solution. Denote the 
conditions of the problem: N = 12, M = 4, n = 7, m = 3. Simple 
combinatorial reasoning lead to a formula which is indeed the formula 
of that distribution: 
 
    (ξ ) .m n m nM N M NP m C C C

    
 
2.3. The Main Characteristics of Distributions 
    2.3.1. Expectation. For a discrete random variable ξ it is the sum of 
the products of all its values х1, х2, …, хn by their probabilities р1, 
р2, …, рn: 
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The denominator is naturally unity. Laplace (1812/1886, p. 189) added 
the adjective mathematical to expectation so as to distinguish it from 
the then topical but now forgotten moral expectation (see below). This 
adjective is regrettably still applied in French and Russian literature.  
    Expectation can be considered a natural ersatz of a random variable, 
as though its mean value; in the theory of errors, it corresponds to the 
generalized arithmetic mean. Denote observations by х1, х2, …, хn, and 
their weights (worth) by р1, р2, …, рn. By definition their mean is 
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                                           (2.8а) 
 
although the denominator is not 1 anymore. If all the weights are 
identical 
 
    1 2
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n
  
                                                       (2.8b) 
 
In § 2.6 I mentioned the selection of bounds covering a measured 
constant as practised by ancient astronomers. Here, I note that they did 
not choose any definite estimator, such as the arithmetic mean; they 
had applied qualitative considerations and thought about convenience 
of subsequent calculations. For observations corrupted by large errors 
this tradition makes sense. 
So when had that mean become the standard estimator? While 
selecting a mean of four observations, Kepler (1609/1992, p. 200/63) 
chose a generalized mean (2.8a) rather than the letter of the law, i. e., 
as I understand him, rather than the mean (2.8b), see Sheynin (1993b, 
p. 186).  
The mean (2.8a) had sometimes been applied with posterior weights 
pi, equally decreasing on either side of the middle portion of the 
observations. This choice is hardly useful since, first, these weights are 
necessarily subjective; and, second, since that estimator only provided 
a correction of the mean (2.8a) for the unevenness of the sample 
density of probability of the observational errors.  
    The expectation (2.7) and the arithmetic mean (2.8) nevertheless 
essentially differ. The former is a number since it presumably contains 
all the values of a random variable, whereas the latter is compiled from 
the results of observations unavoidably corrupted by random errors (as 
well as by systematic errors, but now we do not need them) and is 
therefore a random variable as well, as though a sample value of the 
unknown expectation. Its error ought to be estimated and a similar 
remark will also apply to other characteristics of a random variable. 
At the same time the arithmetic mean is assumed as the value of the 
measured constant (§ 6.2). Note that notation x  for the values of xi is 
standard. 
    For a continuous random variable the expectation is expressed by 
the integral 
 
    Еξ = φ( ) .
b
a
x x dx                                                            (2.9) 
 
Points a and b are the extreme points of the domain of the density φ(х) 
and possibly а = – ∞,  and b = ∞. 
Expectation had begun to be applied before probability was. It first 
appeared, apparently being based on intuitive and subjective chances 
and in everyday life rather than in science. Maimonides (Rabinovitch 
1973, p. 164): A marriage settlement [insurance for a woman against 
divorce or death of husband] of 1000 zuz can be sold at a present value 
of 100, [but] if the face value were 100 it could not be sold for 10 but 
rather for less. Large (though not more likely) gains had been 
considered preferable, and the same subjective tendency is existing 
nowadays (and the organizers of lotteries mercilessly take advantage 
of it). Similar ideas not quite definite either and again connected with 
insurance appeared in Europe a few centuries later (Sheynin 1977, pp. 
206 – 209). 
The theory of probability which officially originated in 1654, in the 
correspondence of Pascal and Fermat, effectively applied expectation. 
Here is one of their main problems which they solved independently 
from each other. Gamblers А and В agree to play until one of them 
scores 5 points (not necessarily in succession) and takes both stakes. 
For some reason the game is interrupted when the score was 4:3 to A. 
So how should they share the stakes?  
    Even then that problem was venerable; there are indications that a 
certain mathematician had solved it at least in a particular case. Note 
that sharing the stakes proportionally to 4:3 would have been fair when 
playing chess, say, i. e., when the gamblers’ skill is decisive. In games 
of chance, however, everything depends on chance and the past cannot 
influence the future (cf. § 1.2.2). 
Here is the solution. Gambler A has probability р1 = 1/2 (Pascal and 
Fermat kept to chances) of winning the next play; he can also lose it 
with the same probability but then the score will equalize and the 
stakes should be equally shared. A’s share (the expectation of his gain) 
will therefore be 1/2 + 1/4 = 3/4 of both stakes. The expectation of the 
second gambler is therefore 1/4 of both stakes and it could have been 
calculated independently. 
    It was a man about town, De Méré, who turned Pascal’s attention to 
games of chance (Pascal 1654/1998, end of Letter dated 29 July 1654). 
He was unable to understand why the probability of an appearance of a 
six in 4 casts of a die was not equal to that of the appearance of two 
sixes in 24 casts of two dice as it followed from an old approximate 
rule. Here, however, are those probabilities:  
 
    Р1 = 1 – (5/6)
4
 = 0.518, Р2 = 1 – (35/36)
24
 = 0.492. 
 
So De Méré knew that gamblers had noted a difference of 
probabilities equal to 0.026. Cf. a similar remark made by Galileo (§ 
1.1.1).  
Huygens (1657) published a treatise on calculations in games of 
chance. He formally introduced the expectation in order to justify the 
sharing of stakes and the solutions of other problems. He substantiated 
the expediency of applying it for estimating a random variable (a 
random winning) by reasonable considerations. 
Jakob Bernoulli (1713, part 1) however suggested a much simpler 
justification. Here is a quotation from Huygens and Bernoulli’s 
reasoning (his part 1 was a reprint of Huygens complete with 
important comments). 
Huygens, Proposition 3. Having р chances to get а and q chances to 
get b and supposing that all these chances are the same, I obtain 
 
    .
pa qb
p q


                                                                           (2.10) 
 
Since р and q are chances rather than probabilities, their sum is not 
unity as it was in formula (2.7). And here is Bernoulli. Suppose there 
are (р + q) gamblers, and each of р boxes contains sum а, and each of 
q boxes contains b. Each gambler takes a box and all together get (ра 
+ qb). However, they are on the same footing, should receive the same 
sum, i. e., (2.10). 
As stated in § 1.2.1, a mathematical theory cannot be based on boxes 
or gamblers, and even De Moivre introduced expectation 
axiomatically, without justifying it. And so it is being introduced 
nowadays, although Laplace (1814/1886, p. XVIII) just stated that it is 
la seule equitable. 
    Several centuries of applications have confirmed the significance of 
the expectation although in 1713 Nikolaus Bernoulli, in a letter to 
Montmort published by the latter (Montmort 1708/1713, p. 402) 
devised a game of chance in which it did not help at all.  
    Gambler A casts a die … However, the die was very soon replaced 
by a coin. And so, if heads appears at once, B pays A 1 écu; if heads 
only appears at the second toss, he pays 2 écus, 4 écus if only at the 
third toss etc. Required is the sum which B ought to receive 
beforehand. 
    Now, A gets 1 écu with probability 1/2, 2 écus with probability 1/4, 
4 écus with probability 1/8 etc and the expectation of his gain is 
 
    1∙(1/2) + 2∙(1/4) + 4∙(1/8) + … = (1/2) + (1/2) + (1/2) + … = ∞. (2.11) 
 
However, no reasonable man will agree to pay B any considerable sum 
and hope for a large (much less, an infinite) gain. He will rather decide 
that heads will first occur not later than at the sixth or seventh toss and 
that he ought to pay beforehand those 1/2 écus not more than six or 
seven times; all the rest infinite terms of the series (2.11) will therefore 
disappear.  
    Buffon (1777, § 18) reported that 2048 such games resulted in A’s 
mean gain of 4.9 écus and that only in 6 cases they consisted of 9 
tosses, of the largest number of them. His was the first statistical study 
of games of chance. On a much greater scale Dutka (1988) conducted 
a similar investigation by applying a computer.  
This paradox continued to interest mathematicians up to our time, 
but it was Condorcet (1784, p. 714) who left the most interesting 
remark: one game, even if infinite, is still only one trial; many games 
are needed for stochastically considering them. Freudenthal (1951) 
independently repeated this remark and additionally suggested that 
before each game the gamblers ought to decide by lot who will pay 
whom beforehand.  
A similar statement about neglecting low probabilities holds for any 
game of chance (and any circumstance in everyday life). If there are 
very large gains in a lottery available with an extremely low 
probability (which the organizers will definitely ensure), they ought to 
be simply forgotten, neglected just like the infinite tail of the series 
(2.11). 
But then, how low should a neglected probability be? Buffon (1777, 
§ 8), issuing from his mortality table, suggested the value 1/10,000, the 
probability of a healthy man 56 years old dying within the next 24 
hours. What does it mean for the Petersburg game? We have 
 
    1/2
n
 = 1/10,000, 2
n
 = 10,000, nlg2 = 4 and n ≈ 13.3.  
 
    Even that is too large: recall Buffon’s experiment in which the 
maximal number of tosses only amounted to 9. This result also means 
that 1/10,000 was too low; we may often neglect much higher 
probabilities and, anyway, a single value for a neglected probability 
valid in any circumstances should not be assigned at all. And some 
events (the Earth’s collision with a large asteroid) should be predicted 
with a probability much higher than (1 – 1/10,000). It is not however 
clear how to prevent such global catastrophes. 
Reader! Do you think about such probabilities when crossing the 
road? 
While attempting to solve the paradox of the invented game, Daniel 
Bernoulli (1738) introduced moral expectation (but not the term itself). 
He published his memoir in Petersburg, and thus appeared the name 
Petersburg game. In essence, he thought that the real value of a 
gambler’s gain is the less the greater is his fortune. He applied his 
novelty to other risky operations and for some decades it had been 
widely appraised (but not implemented in practice). At the end of the 
19
th
 century economists had developed the theory of marginal utility 
by issuing from moral expectation. 
    2.3.1-1. The properties of the expectation. 1) Suppose that ξ = c is 
constant. Then 
 
    Ес = φ( ) φ( ) .
b b
a a
c x dx c x dx c    
 
The expectation of a constant is that very constant. 
    2) The expectation of a random variable аξ is 
 
    Еаξ = φ( ) Eξ.
b
a
a x x dx a   
 
When multiplying a random variable by a constant its expectation is 
multiplied by that very constant.  
3) Two (or more) random variables ξ and η are given; their densities 
are φ(x) and η(y) and the expectation of their sum is sought. It is equal 
to the double integral 
 
Е(ξ + η) = ( )φ( )ψ( )
b d
a c
x y x y dxdy  = 
                 φ( )ψ( )  φ( )ψ( ) .
b d b d
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Here, c and d are the extreme points of the domain of the second 
function and a and b have a similar meaning (see above). Notation η(y) 
instead of η(x) does not in essence change anything but 
transformations become clearer.  
    The first integral can be represented as 
 
    ψ( ) φ( )
d b
c a
y dy x x dx   Еξ, 
 
since the integral with respect to y is unity. Just the same, the second 
integral is Еη and therefore 
 
    Е(ξ + η) = Еξ + Еη. 
 
    The expectation of a sum of random variables is equal to the sum of 
the expectations of the terms. A similar statement can be proved about 
the difference of random variables: its expectation is equal to the 
difference of the expectations of the terms.  
    Note however that differences in such theorems (not only in the 
theory of probability) are usually not mentioned since by definition 
subtraction means addition of contrary magnitudes; thus, а – с ≡ а + 
(– с). 
4) Without proof: the expectation of a product of two independent 
random variables equals the product of their expectations:  
 
    Е(ξη) = Еξ∙Еη. 
 
This property is immediately generalized on a larger number of 
random variables. 
    All the properties mentioned above also take place for expectations 
of discrete random variables.  
    2.3.2. Variance is the second main notion characterizing 
distributions of random variables, their scattering. An inscription on a 
Soviet matchbox stated: approximately 50 matches. But suppose that 
actually one such box contains 30 matches, another one, 70. The mean 
is indeed 50, but is not the scattering too great? And what does 
approximately really mean? 
Suppose that only some values х1, х2, …, хn of a random variable ξ 
(a sample of size n) are/is known. Then the sample variance of ξ is 
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                                                         (2.12) 
 
It is also called empirical since the values of хi are the results of some 
experiment or trial. 
Why function (2.12) is chosen as a measure of scattering, and why 
its denominator is (n – 1) rather than n? I attempt at explaining it, but 
first I add that the variance (not sample variance) of the same ξ, varξ, 
of a discrete or continuous variables is, respectively, 
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where a, b and φ(х) have the same meaning as in formula (2.9). 
It was Gauss (1823) who introduced the variance as a measure of 
the scattering of observations. Its choice, as he indicated, is more or 
less arbitrary, but such a measure should be especially sensitive to 
large errors, i. e. should include (х – Еξ) raised to some natural power 
(2, 3, …), and remain positive which excludes odd powers. Finally, 
that measure should be as simple as possible which means the choice 
of the second power of that binomial. Actually, Gauss (1823, §§ 37 – 
38) had to determine only the sample variance and to apply the 
arithmetic mean instead of the expectation. Below, I will say more 
about the advantages of the variance.  
Suppose that хi, i = 1, 2, …, n, are the errors of observation, then the 
sample variance will be 
 
    [xx]/n 
 
where [xx] is Gauss’ notation denoting the sum of the squares of the хi. 
These errors are however unknown, and we have to replace them by 
the deviations of the observations from their arithmetic mean. 
Accordingly, as Gauss proved in the sections mentioned above, the 
sample variance ought to be represented by formula (2.12). He (1821 – 
1823/1887, p. 199) remarked that that change was also demanded by 
the dignity of science.  
But suppose that a series of observations is corrupted by 
approximately the same systematic error. Then those formulas will not 
take it into considerations, will therefore greatly corrupt reality: the 
scattering will not perhaps be large although the observations deviated 
from the measured constant. Gauss himself had directly participated in 
geodetic observations, therefore did not trust his own formulas 
(because of the unavoidable systematic errors) and measured each 
angle until becoming satisfied that further work was useless. Extracts 
from his field records are published in vol. 9 of his Werke, pp. 278 – 
281. 
    Not only the sample variance, but a square root of it (not only s
2
, but 
s) is applied as well. That s is called standard deviation, or, in the 
theory of errors, mean square error. 
And now we can specify statements similar to approximately 50 
matches in a box. Carry out a thankless task: count the matches х1, 
х2, …, х10 in 10 boxes, calculate their mean x  (their sample mean, 
since the number of such boxes is immense), the deviations (х1 – x ), 
(х2 – x ), …, (х10 – x ), and finally the sample variance (or standard 
deviation). A deviation of some xi from the approximately promised 
value that exceeds two mean square errors is already serious. 
    The expectation of a random variable can be infinite, as in the case 
of the Petersburg game, and the same can happen with the variance. 
Example. A continuous random variable distributed according to the 
Cauchy law 
 
    φ(x) = 
2
2
,
π(1 )x
 0 ≤ x < ∞.                                          (2.14) 
 
Note that equalities such as х = ∞ should be avoided since infinity is 
not a number but a variable. Also bear in mind that the distribution 
(2.14) first occurred in Poisson (1824, p. 278). 
    Now, the variance. It is here 
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The second integral is 
 
     0arctg  x
  = π/2,  
 
but the first does not exist (and the variance is infinite): 
 
     0
0
 dx x

  → ∞. 
 
The arithmetic mean of observations, if they are so unsatisfactory 
that their errors obey the Cauchy distribution, is not better than an 
isolated observation. Indeed, according to formula (2.16) from § 2.3.2-
2 the variance of the mean of n observations is n times less than the 
variance of a single observation, that is, n times less than infinity and 
is therefore also infinite.  
2.3.2-1. A second definition of variance. Definition (2.13b) can be 
written as 
 
    varξ = 2φ( )
b
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Now, Eξ is constant and can be separated: 
 
    varξ = 2φ( )
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    By definition, the first integral is Eξ2, and the second, Eξ. The third 
integral is unity according to the property of the density. Therefore, 
     varξ = Eξ2 – 2(Eξ)2 + (Eξ)2 = Eξ2 – (Eξ)2.                       (2.15) 
 
    This formula is usually assumed as the main definition of variance. 
    2.3.2-2. The properties of density. 
1) The density of a sum of independent random variables. By the 
second definition of variance we have 
 
    var(ξ + η) = E(ξ + η)2 – [E(ξ + η)]2 =  
    Eξ2 + 2E(ξη) + Eη2 – [(Eξ)2 + 2EξEη + Eη2].  
 
Then, according to the fourth property of expectation of independent 
random variables (§ 2.3.1-1),  
 
    E(ξη) = Eξ∙Eη 
 
so that 
 
    var(ξ + η) = [Eξ2 – (Eξ)2] + [Eη2 – (Eη)2] = varξ + varη.  
 
    The variance of a sum of independent random variables is equal to 
the sum of their variances.  
2) Corollary: Variance of the arithmetic mean. Given observations 
х1, х2, …, хn and their arithmetic mean (2.8b) 
 
    1 2
... nx x xx
n
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  
 
is calculated. Formula (2.12) provides the sample variance of 
observation хi, but now we need the variance of the mean. By the 
theorems on the variance of the sum of random variables (the results of 
observation are random!) and on the product of a random variable by a 
constant (here, it is 1/n), we obtain at once a simple but important 
formula 
 
    var
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The variance of the arithmetic mean of n observations is n times less 
than the variance of each of them. 
Here, like in formula (2.12), we certainly assume that the 
observations are possible values of one and the same random variable.  
3) The variance of a linear function of a random variable. Suppose 
that η = а + bξ is a linear function of random variable ξ (and therefore 
random as well just like any function depending on a random variable). 
The variance of ξ, varξ, is known and required is varη. Such problems 
occur often enough. 
By formula (2.15) 
 
    varη = Eη2 – (Eη)2 = E(a + bξ)2 – [E(a + bξ)]2. 
     The first term is 
 
    E(a
2
 + 2abξ + b2ξ2) = a2 + 2abEξ + b2Eξ2.  
 
The second term is 
 
    [Ea + E(bξ)]2 = (Ea)2 + 2EaE(bξ) + (Ebξ)2 = a2 + 2abEξ + b2(Eξ)2  
 
and their difference is b
2
[Eξ2 – (Eξ)2]. 
    According to formula (2.15) varη = b2var ξ. 
And so, an addition of a constant to a random variable does not 
change the variance, and, when multiplying such a variable by a 
constant coefficient, its variance is multiplied by the square of that 
constant: 
 
    var(a + ξ) = varξ, var(bξ) = b2varξ. 
 
2.4. Parameters of Some Distributions 
    In § 2.2 we have determined the parameters of a few distributions, 
but the binomial and the normal laws are still left. 
2.4.1. The binomial distribution. Suppose that µk is a random 
number of the occurrences of an event in the k-th trial, 0 or 1. If the 
probability of its happening is р, then 
 
    Eµk = 1∙p + 0∙q = p. 
 
In a series of n trials that event occurs 
 
    (µ1 + µ2 + … + µn) = µ times, Eµ = Eµ1 + Eµ2 + … + Eµn = pn.  
 
    Then, see formula (2.15), 
 
    varµk = E
2μk  – (Eµk)
2
. 
 
However, 2μk takes the same values, 0 and 1, as µk, and with the same 
probabilities, p and q, so that 
 
    varµk = p – p
2
 = p(1 – p) = pq, varµ = varµ1 + varµ2 + … + varµn = pqn. 
 
The magnitudes Eµ and varµ characterize the frequency µ. Recall 
that in § 2.2.3 we discussed the parameters of the binomial distribution 
proper. 
2.4.2. The normal distribution. It follows from formula (2.4) that the 
form of the normal curve depends on the value of ζ; the less it is, the 
more is the area under that curve concentrated in its central part. The 
values of the random variable ξ close to the abscissa of the curve’s 
maximum become more probable, the random variable as though 
shrinks. 
At а = 0 the graph of the density of the normal distribution becomes 
symmetrical with respect to the y-axis so that а is the location 
parameter. Note that this term is applied to any densities whose 
formula contains the difference х – а. 
The analytical meaning of both parameters is very simple: 
 
    а = Еξ, ζ2 = varξ.                                            (2.17а, 2.17b) 
 
We will prove (2.17a) and outline the proof of (2.17b). We have 
 
    Еξ = 
2
2
1 ( )
exp[ ] .
2σσ 2π
x a
x dx



  
 
Now, х = [(х – а) + а] and the integral can be written as 
 
    
2 2
2 2
1 ( ) ( )
{ ( )exp[ ] exp[ }.
2σ 2σσ 2π
x a x a
x a dx a dx
 
 
 
      
 
In the first integral, the integrand is an odd function of (х – а), 
which, just as х, changes unboundedly from – ∞ to ∞. This integral 
therefore disappears (the negative area under the x-axis located to the 
left of the y-axis is equal to the positive area above the x-axis located 
to the right of the y-axis). 
    Then, in the second integral, let 
 
    ,  σ 2 ,
σ 2
x a
z dx dz

                                                  (2.18) 
 
so that it is equal to 
 
    2exp( ) σ 2.z dz


   
 
Euler was the first to calculate it; without the multiplier ζ√2 it is equal 
to √π. Finally, taking into account all three multipliers,  
a, ζ√2 и 1/σ 2π , we arrive at а, QED. 
    Now the formula (2.17b): 
 
    varξ = E(ξ – Eξ)2 = 
2
2
2
1 ( )
( ) exp[ ] .
2σσ 2π
x a
x a dx



   
 
We have applied here the just derived formula (2.17a). Now we ought 
to introduce a new variable, see (2.18), and integrate by parts. 
2.5. Other Characteristics of Distributions 
2.5.1. Those replacing expectation. For a sample (sometimes the 
only possibility) those characteristics replace the arithmetic mean or 
estimate the location of the measured constant in some other way.  
2.5.1-1. The median. Arrange the observations х1, х2, …, хn of a  
random variable in an ascending order and suppose that the thus 
ordered sequence is х1 ≤ х2 ≤ … ≤ хn. Its median is the middlemost 
observation, quite definite for odd values of n. Suppose that n = 7, the 
median will then be х4. For even values of n the median will be the 
halfsum of the two middle terms; thus, for n = 12, the halfsum of х6 
and х7.  
For continuous random variables with density φ(х) the median is 
point х0 which divides the area under the density curve into equal parts: 
 
    
0
0
φ( ) φ( ) 1/ 2.
x b
a x
x dx x dx    
 
In other words, the median corresponds to equality F(х) = 1/2. To 
recall: the entire area under the density curve is unity; а and b are the 
extreme points of the domain of φ(х). 
    For some densities, as also when the density is unknown, the 
median characterizes a random variable more reliably then the 
arithmetic mean. The same is true if the extreme observations possibly 
are essentially erroneous. Indeed, they can considerably displace the 
mean but the median will be less influenced. 
Mendeleev (1877/1949, p. 156), who was not only a chemist, but an 
outstanding metrologist, mistakenly thought that, when the density 
remained unknown, the arithmetic mean ought to be chosen. 
Continuous distributions are also characterized by quantiles which 
correspond to some probabilities р, that is, points х = хр for which F(x) 
= р, so that the median is a quantile corresponding to р = 1/2. Its exact 
location can be not quite certain, cf. the case of the median.  
2.5.1-2. The mode. This is the point (or these are the points) of 
maximal density. It (one of them) can coincide with the arithmetic 
mean. Accordingly, the density is called unimodal, bimodal, … or 
even antimodal (when a density has a point of minimum). In case of 
discrete random variables the mode is rarely applied.  
2.5.1-3. The semi-range (mid-range). This is a very simple but 
unreliable measure since the extreme values can be considerably 
erroneous and no other observations are taken into account. It had been 
widely applied in the 18
th
 century for estimating mean monthly values 
of meteorological elements (for example, air temperatures). It was 
certainly easier to calculate the mid-range than the mean of 30 values. 
Interestingly, Daniel Bernoulli (1778, § 10) indicated that he had 
found it to be less often wrong than [he] thought …  
2.5.2. Characteristics replacing the variance 
    2.5.2-1. The range. The (sample) range is the difference between the 
maximal and the minimal measured values of a random variable, cf. § 
2.5.1-3. The not necessarily equal differences (хn – x ) and ( x  – х1) 
are also sometimes applied. All these differences are unreliable. In 
addition to the remarks in that subsection I note that they can well 
increase with the number of observations; there can appear a value less 
than х1 or larger than хn. 
It is certainly possible to apply instead the fractions (хn – х1)/n, (хn – 
x )/n and ( x  – х1)/n. The denominator coincides with the possibly 
increasing number of observations but the numerator changes 
uncertainly. All the measures mentioned here concern a series of 
observations rather than a single result. 
2.5.2-2. The mean absolute error. It, just as the probable error (see 
2.5.2-3), characterizes a single observation. Denote observations by х1, 
х2, …, хn, then the mean absolute error will be 
 
    
1
| | .
n
i
i
x n

  
 
It had been applied, although not widely, when treating observations.  
2.5.2-3. The probable error. It was formally introduced by Bessel 
(1816, pp. 141 – 142) as a measure of precision, but even Huygens 
(1669/1895), in a letter to his brother dated 28 Nov. 1669, mentioned 
the idea of a probable value of a random variable. Discussing the 
random duration of human life, he explained the difference between 
the expected interval (the mean value derived from data on many 
people) and the age to which a person with equal probabilities can live 
or not.  
    Both durations of life should be calculated separately for men and 
women, which in those times was not recognized. Women generally 
live longer and this possibly compensates them for a life more difficult 
both in the biological and social sense but they seem to recall this 
circumstance rather rarely. 
    Bessel had indeed applied that same idea, repeatedly found in 
population statistics and, for example, when investigating minor 
changes in the period of the swings of a pendulum (Daniel Bernoulli 
1780). According to Bessel, a probable error of an observation is such 
that with equally probability will be either less or larger than the 
really made error. 
For symmetric distributions the probable error is numerically equal 
to the distance between the median and the qauntile corresponding to р 
= 1/4 or 3/4; it is the probability that an observation thus deviates in 
either side from the median. For the normal distribution that distance is 
0.6745ζ, and many authors had understood (still understand?) that 
relation as a universal formula or had tacitly thought that they have 
dealt with the normal distribution.  
    Moreover, I am not sure that there exists a generally accepted 
definition of the probable error suitable for asymmetric distributions, i. 
e., when the distances from the median to the quantiles р = 1/4 and 3/4 
do not coincide. If in such cases the probable error is still meaningful, 
it is perhaps permissible to say that it is equal to half the distance 
between those quantiles. 
The idea of the probable error is so natural that that measure became 
universally adopted whereas, perhaps until the second half of the 20
th
 
century, the mean square error had been all but forgotten. In the third 
(!) edition of his serious geodetic treatise Bomford (1971, pp. 610 – 
611) reluctantly abandoned it and went over to the mean square error. 
So why is the latter better? We may bear in mind that the probable 
error is connected with the median which is not always preferable to 
the arithmetic mean. Then, it, the mean square error (or, rather, the 
variance), is the most reliable measure. The variance (we may only 
discuss the sample variance) is a random variable, it therefore has its 
own sample variance. True, as mentioned above, a similar remark is 
applicable to any sample measure (in particular, to the arithmetic 
mean). However, unlike other measures of scattering, the variance of 
the variance is known, first derived by Gauss (1823, § 40). True, he 
made an elementary mistake corrected by Helmert (1904), then 
independently by Kolmogorov et al (1947).  
One circumstance ought to be however indicated. Practically applied 
is not the variance, but its square root, the standard deviation (the 
mean square error); and if the variance of the variance is a, it does not 
at all mean that the variance of the latter is √а; for that matter, it is 
only known for the normal distribution, see below. Again, the sample 
variance is an unbiased estimate of the general, of the population 
variance which means that its expectation is equal to that variance, 
whereas the sample standard deviation has no similar property. Recall 
that Gauss (§ 2.3.2) remarked that the formula for the sample variance 
had to be changed; now I additionally state that he had thus 
emphasised the essential role of unbiasedness although currently it is 
much less positively estimated. 
2.5.2-4. An indefinite indication of scattering. We sometimes meet 
with indications such as This magnitude is equal to а ± c. It can be 
understood as … equal to any value between a – с and а + с, but it is 
also possible that с is not the maximal but, for example, the probable 
error. And, how was that c obtained? We have approached here the 
important subject of interval estimation. 
2.6. Interval Estimation 
Denote some parameter of a function or density by λ and suppose 
that its sample value ˆ  is obtained. Required is an estimate of the 
difference | ˆ  – λ|. Its interval estimation means that, with α and δ 
being indicated, 
 
    Р(| ˆ  – λ| < δ) > 1 – α. 
 
Now, we may state that the confidence interval ˆ ˆ[ δ;  δ]     
covers the unknown λ with confidence probability (confidence 
coefficient) (1 – α). This method of estimation is reasonable if α is 
small (for example, 0.01 or 0.05, but certainly much larger than the 
Buffon value 1/10,000), and such that δ is also sufficiently small. 
Otherwise the interval estimation will show that either the number of 
observations was too small or that they were not sufficiently precise. 
Note also that in any case other observations can lead to other values 
of ˆ  and δ.  
Suppose that a constant A is determined by observations. Then, 
adopting simplest assumptions (Bervi 1899), we may assume that the 
obtained range [x1; xn] covers it with probability 
 
    P(x1 ≤ A ≤ xn) = 1 – 1/2
n–1
. 
 
I indicated the deficiency of this trick in § 2.5.1-3. Similar conclusions 
were made by astronomers in the antiquity (Sheynin 1993b, § 2.1). 
Issuing from all the existing observations (not only his own) the 
astronomer selected some bounds (а and b) and stated that a ≤ A ≤ b. 
Probabilities had not been mentioned but the conclusion made was 
considered almost certain. 
When determining a constant, any measure of scatter may be 
interpreted as tantamount to a confidence characteristic. Indeed, 
suppose that the arithmetic mean x  of observations is calculated and 
its mean square error m determined. Then the probability P( x  – m ≤ 
x  ≤ x  + m) can be established by statistical tables of the pertinent law 
of distribution as P(0 ≤ x  ≤ x  + m) – P(0 ≤ x  ≤ x  – m); the 
difference between strict and non-strict inequalities can be neglected. 
So exactly that P is indeed the confidence probability and [ x  – m; x  
+ m ], the confidence interval. 
2.7. The Moments of a Random Variable 
    This subject can be quite properly included in § 2.6, but it deserves 
a separate discussion. Moments characterise the density and can 
sometimes establish it. 
The initial moment of order s of a discrete or continuous random 
variable ξ is, respectively, 
 
    αs(ξ) = ( ), φ( ) .
s s
s
x
x p x x x dx                                    (2.19) 
 
In the first case, the summing is extended over all the values of х 
having probabilities р(х) whereas the integral is taken within the 
extreme points of the domain of the known or unknown density φ(х) of 
the continuous random variable. 
    Also applied are the central moments 
 
    µs(ξ) = ( Eξ) ( ),  μ (ξ) = ( Eξ) φ( ) .
s s
i i s
i
x p x x x dx      (2.20) 
 
Both these formulas (the integral is taken between appropriate bounds) 
can be represented as  
 
    µs(ξ) = E(ξ – Eξ)
s
. 
 
    Sample (empirical) initial moments for both discrete and continuous 
random variables certainly coincide: 
 
    ms(ξ) =  ,
s
i
i
x n                                                        (2.21) 
 
where n is the number of measured (observed) values of ξ. 
    The central sample moments are 
 
    ms(ξ – 
1
) ( ) .six x x
n
   
 
    The measured (observed) values are often combined within certain 
intervals or categories. Thus (Smirov & Dunin-Barkovski 1959/1969, 
§ 1 in Chapter 3), 70 samples containing 5 manufactured articles each 
were selected for checking the size of such articles. In 55 samples the 
size of each of the 5 articles was standard, in 12 of them 2 were non-
standard, and in 3, 1 was non-standard: 
 
    Number of samples                                 55           12           3 
    Number of defective articles                   0             1           2  
    Frequencies of the various outcomes      0.786      0.171    0.043 
 
Here the frequency, for example in the fist column is 55/70.  
Many definitions of mathematical statistics have been offered, but 
only once were statistical data mentioned (Kolmogorov & Prokhorov 
1974/1977, p. 721): they denote information about the number of 
objects which possess certain attributes in some more or less general 
set. 
Those numbers above are indeed statistical data; they were 
separated into sets with differing numbers of defective articles in the 
samples. Such separation can often be made in several ways; however, 
if the range of the values of the random variable (the number of 
defective articles) is sufficiently wide (here, we have a very small 
range from 0 to 5, but actually even from 0 to 2), there should not be 
too few sets or intervals. On the other hand, there should not be too 
many of them either: too many subdivisions of the data is a 
charlatanisme scientifique (Quetelet 1846, p. 278) 
And so, when combining the data, formula (2.21) becomes 
 
    ms(ξ) = 
1
,
i
s
x i
i
n x
n
                                                       (2.22) 
 
where nx is the number of the values of the random variable in interval 
х. In our example 
 
    ms(ξ) = 
1
70
(55∙0s + 12∙1s + 3∙2s) = 0.786∙0s + 0.171∙1s + 0.043∙2s.  
 
The cases of s = 1 and 2 (see the very beginning of this section) 
coincide with expectation and variance respectively and formulas 
(2.20) correspond to formulas (2.13). The first moment is the 
expectation, the second moment is the variance. But is it possible and 
necessary to establish something about the other almost infinitely 
many moments? Suffice it to consider the next two of them.  
Suppose that the density φ(х) is symmetrical with respect to the y-
axis. Then for odd values of s the moments 
 
    νs = φ( ) 0.
sx x dx


   
 
Indeed, in this case the integrand is the product of an odd and an even 
function and is therefore odd and the integral is taken between 
symmetrical bounds. 
   If some odd moment differs from zero, the density cannot be 
symmetric (i. e., even) and this moment will therefore characterize the 
deviation of φ(х) from symmetry. But which moment should we 
choose as the measure of asymmetry? 
All sample moments depend on the observed values of the 
appropriate random variable, are therefore random variables as well 
and possess a variance. It is also known that the variances of the 
moments of higher orders are larger than those of the first few. The 
moments of higher orders are therefore unreliable. 
It is thus natural to choose the third moment as the measure of 
asymmetry of the density φ(х) of a random variable; more precisely, 
the third sample moment since apart from observations we have 
nothing to go on: 
 
    m3(ξ) = 
31 ( ) .
1
ix x
n


                                           (2.23) 
 
One more circumstance. The dimensionality of the third moment is 
equal to the cube of the dimensionality of ( )ix x . For obtaining a 
dimensionless measure, (2.23) should be divided by s
3
, see formula 
(2.12). The final measure of asymmetry of φ(х) is thus 
 
    sk = 
3
3 .m s  
 
When discussing that formula (2.12), we indicated why its 
denominator should be (n – 1) rather than n. The same cause 
compelled us to change the denominator in formula (2.23). 
Now the fourth moment. For a normal random variable it is 3ζ4, 
whereas the second moment is ζ2, see § 2.4.2. For that distribution we 
therefore have 
 
    44ν /σ 3.  
 
If we now calculate the so-called excess (more precisely, the sample 
excess) 
 
    εk = m
4
/s
4
 – 3, 
 
its deviation from 0 can be chosen as a measure of the deviation  
of un unknown density of distribution from the normal law (for which 
the excess disappears). The excess is here useful since in one or 
another sense the normal distribution is usually best. Pearson (1905, p. 
181) introduced the excess when studying asymmetric laws.  
In general, if the density is unknown, the knowledge of the first four 
moments is essential: when considering them as the corresponding 
theoretical moments of the density, it will be possible to imagine its 
type and therefore to calculate its parameters (hardly more than four of 
them). 
To repeat: the normal law has only two parameters; therefore, if the 
calculated excess is sufficiently small, the unknown distribution will 
be determined by the first two moments. But what, indeed, is 
sufficiently small? We leave this question aside. 
2.8. The Distribution of a Function of Random Variables 
Suppose that random variables ξ and η have densities φ1(х) and φ2(у) 
and that η = f(ξ) with a continuous and differentiable function f. The 
density φ1(х) is known and it is required to derive φ2(у). This problem 
is important and has to be solved often. 
First of all, we (unnecessarily?) provide information about inverse 
functions and restrict our description to strictly monotone (increasing 
or decreasing) functions. The domain of an arbitrary function can 
however be separated into intervals of monotonic behaviour and each 
such interval can then be studied separately. 
Suppose now that the function у = f(х) strictly decreases on interval 
[a; b]. Turn its graph to the left until the y-axis is horizontal, and you 
will see the graph of the inverse function х = ψ(у), also one-valued 
since the initial function was monotone. True, the positive direction of 
the y-axis and therefore of the argument y (yes, y, not x anymore) will 
be unusual. This nuisance disappears when looking with your mind’s 
eye on the graph from the other side of the plane. 
Return now to our problem. When ξ moves along [a; b], the random 
point (ξ; η) moves along the curve у = f(х). For example, if ξ = х0, then 
η = f(х0) = у0. It is seen that the distribution function (not the density) 
F(у) of η, or Р(η < у), is 
 
    Р(η < у) = Р(x < ξ < b) = 1 1 φ ( )  = φ ( ) ,
b b
x x
x dx z dz    
 
where (х; у) is a current point on the curve у = f(х). 
    Pursuing a methodical aim, we have changed the variable in the 
integral above but certainly did not alter the lower bound. However, it 
can be expressed as a function of у: х = ψ(у). So now  
 
    F(y) = Р(η < у) = 1
ψ( )
 φ ( ) .
b
y
z dz   
 
Differentiate both parts of this equality with respect to у, and obtain 
thus the density 
 
    F′(у) = φ2(у) = – φ1[ψ(у)]∙ψ′(у). 
 
For a strictly increasing function f(x) the reasoning is the same 
although now it is the upper variable bound rather than the lower and 
the minus sign will disappear. Both cases can be written as  
 
    φ2(у) = φ1[ψ(у)]∙|ψ′(у)|. 
 
    Example (Ventzel 1969, p. 265). 
 
    η = 1 – ξ3, φ1(х) = 2
1
,
π(1 )x
 – ∞ < х < ∞. 
 
Here, φ1(х), is the Cauchy distribution (mentioned in § 2.3.2 in a 
slightly different form). We have 
 
    x = ψ(у) = 3 1 ,y   
 
    ψ′(у) = – 31
2 23 3
1 1
,  φ [ψ( )] [ 1 ] ,
3 (1 ) π[1 (1 ) ]
y f y
y y
  
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    φ2(y) = 
23
1
π[1 (1 ) ]y  23
1
3 (1 )y
. 
 
    Such a simple function … The y can certainly be replaced by x. 
2.9. The Bienaymé – Chebyshev Inequality 
    This is 
 
    P(|ξ – Eξ| < β) > 1 – ζ2/β2, β > 0                                 (2.24) 
 
or, which is evident,  
 
P(|ξ – Eξ| ≥ β) < ζ2/β2. 
 
    Inequality (2.24), and therefore its second form as well, take place 
for any random variable having an expectation and a variance and are 
therefore extremely interesting from a theoretical point of view. 
However, exactly this property means that the inequality is rather 
rough (I discuss any one of them). In a way, it combines the two 
magnitudes, ζ and β, without needing any other information. 
    Bienaymé (1853) established that inequality, but, unlike Chebyshev 
(1867 and later), did not pay special attention to his discovery since 
the subject of his memoir was not directly connected with it. 
William Herschel (1817/1912, p. 579)  
presumed that any star promiscuously chosen […] out of [more than 
14 thousand] is not likely to differ much from a certain mean size of 
them all.  
Stars unimaginably differ one from another and do not belong to a 
single population at all. The variance of their sizes is practically 
infinite, the notion of their mean size meaningless, and the inequality 
(2.24) cannot be applied. From another point of view, we may add: no 
positive data – no conclusion (Ex nihilo nihil fit!).  
    The English physician J. Y. Simpson (1847 – 1848/1871, p. 102) 
had similar thoughts: The data [about mortality after amputations] 
have been objected to on the ground that they are collected from too 
many different hospitals and too many sources. But […] I believe […] 
that this very circumstance renders them more, instead of less, 
trustworthy.  
 
Chapter 3. Systems of Random Variables. Correlation 
3.1. Correlation 
In the first approximation it may be stated that the variable у is a  
function of argument x on some interval or the entire number axis if, 
on that interval (on the entire axis), one and only one value of у 
corresponds to each value of х. Such dependence can exist between 
random variables. For example, Bessel (1838, §§ 1 – 2): the error of a 
certain type of measurements is η = аξ2.  
    Less tight connections between random variables are also possible 
(the stature of children depending on the stature of parents). Their 
study is the aim of an important chapter of mathematical statistics, of 
the theory of correlation. That word means comparison. More 
precisely, correlation considers the change in the law of distribution of 
a random variable depending on the change of another (or other) 
random variable(s) and as a rule on accompanying circumstances as 
well. 
    Lacking that specification and certainly without quantitative studies 
of phenomena (qualitative) correlation had been known in antiquity. 
(As stated in § 1.1.3, the entire ancient science had been qualitative.) 
Thus, Hippocrates (1952, No. 44): Persons who are naturally very fat 
are apt to die earlier than those who are slender. Climatic belts were 
isolated in antiquity, but only Humboldt (1817, p. 466) connected 
them with mean yearly air temperatures. 
    Seidel (1865 – 1866), a German astronomer and mathematician, 
first quantitatively investigated correlation. He studied the dependence 
of the monthly cases of typhoid fever on the level of subsoil water, and 
then both on that level and the rainfall. 
    Galton (1889) had begun to develop the theory of correlation proper,  
and somewhat later Pearson followed suit. Nevertheless, it had been 
sufficiently improved much later. Markov (1916/1951, p. 533) 
disparagingly but not altogether justly declared that the correlation 
theory’s 
   positive side is not significant enough and consists in a simple usage 
of the method of least squares for discovering linear dependences. 
However, not being satisfied with approximately determining various 
coefficients, the theory also indicates their probable errors, and enters 
here the realm of imagination […]. 
Discovering dependences, even if only linear, is important and 
estimation of precision is certainly necessary. Linnik (Markov 1951, p. 
670) noted that in those times correlation theory had still being 
developed so that Markov’s criticism made sense. However, Hald 
(1998, p. 677), without mentioning either Markov or Linnik, described 
Fisher’s pertinent contribution of 1915 (which Markov certainly did 
not see) and thus refuted Linnik. Anyway, here is Slutsky’s reasonable 
general comment (letter to Markov of 1912, see Sheynin 1999b, p. 
132): 
The shortcomings of Pearson’s exposition are temporary and of the 
same kind as the known shortcomings of mathematics in the 17
th
 and 
18
th
 centuries.  
Now we shall discuss the correlation coefficient. Two random 
variables, ξ are η, are given. Calculate the moment 
     µξη = E[(ξ – Eξ)(η – Eη)] = E(ξη) – 2Eξ Eη + Eξ Eη = 
              E(ξη) – Eξ Eη 
 
and divide it by the standard deviations ζξ and ζη to obtain a 
dimensionless measure, the correlation coefficient 
 
    rξη = 
ξη
ξ η
μ
σ σ
. 
 
For independent ξ and η both µξη and (therefore) rξη disappear. The 
inverse statement is not true! Cf.: a sparrow is a bird, but a bird is not 
always a sparrow. One case is sufficient for refuting the inverse 
statement here also. So suppose that the density of ξ is an even 
function, then Еξ = 0 and Еξ3 = 0. Introduce now η = ξ2, then µξη = Еξ
3
 
– 0 = 0, QED. It follows that (even a functional) dependence can exist 
between random variables when the correlation coefficient is zero.  
   That coefficient takes values from – 1 until 1. Correlation can 
therefore be negative. Example: the correlation (the dependence) 
between the stature and the weight of a person is positive, but between 
the distance from a lamp and its brightness is negative. Accordingly, 
we say that the correlation is direct or inverse. 
3.2. The Distribution of Systems of Random Variables 
Consider the probability Р(ξ < х, η < у). Geometrically, these 
inequalities correspond to an infinite region – ∞ < ξ < х, – ∞ < η < у, 
whereas analytically P is expressed by the distribution function 
 
    F(x; y) = Р(ξ < х, η < у). 
 
Taken separately, the random variables ξ and η have distribution 
functions F1(x) and F2(y) and densities f1(x) and f2(y). Thus, for an 
infinitely large x the inequality ξ < х is identical and 
 
    F(+ ∞; y) = F2(y). 
 
     The density is also introduced here similar to the one-dimensional 
case: 
 
    Р[(ξ; η) belongs to region D] = ( ; ) .
D
f x y dxdy  
 
Function f(x; y) is indeed the density. For independent ξ and η we have 
 
    f(x; y) = f1(x) f2(y). 
 
For the bivariate (two-dimensional) normal law the density f (х; у) is 
 
    
2 2
2 2 2
ξ ξ η η
1 1 ( Eξ) 2 ( Eξ)( Eη) ( Eη)
exp{ [ ]}.
2πσ σ 2(1 ) σ σ σ σx y
x r x y y
r
   
  

 
 
Apart from the previous notation, r is the correlation coefficient for ξ 
and η.  
3.2.1. The distribution of a sum of random variables. Given, random 
variables ξ and η with densities φ1(х) and φ2(у). Required is the law of 
distribution of their sum ω = ξ + η. For the distribution function of 
their system we have 
 
    F(x, y) = φ( ,  ) .x y dxdy    
 
In case of infinite domains of both functions the integration is over an 
infinite half-plane  
 
    F(x; y) = φ( ; )
x
dx x y dy
 
 
  . 
 
    Differentiating it with respect to ω, we will have 
 
    ω ( ; ) φ( ;ω ) (ω)F x y x x dx f


    , 
 
or, after changing the places of х and у, 
 
    ω ( ; ) φ(ω ; ) (ω)F x y y y dy f


    . 
 
    In case of independent random variables the distribution sought is 
called composition (of their densities). The formulas above lead to 
 
    f(ω) = 1 2 1 2φ ( )φ (ω ) φ (ω )φ ( )x x dx y y dy
 
 
    . 
 
Calculations are sometimes essentially simplified by geometrical 
considerations (Ventzel 1969, §§ 12.5 – 12.6). We only remark that 
the encounter problem (§ 1.1.2) can also be interpreted by means of 
the notions of random variable and density of distribution. Indeed, a 
random point (ξ; η) should be situated in a square with opposite 
vertices O(0, 0) and C(60, 60), and the sum (ξ + η) should be between 
two parallel lines, y = x ± 20 (I have chosen 60 and 20 in that section). 
The distribution of that point could have ensured the derivation of the 
probability of the encounter. To recall, the moments ξ and η of the 
arrival of the two friends were independent.  
 
Chapter 4. Limit Theorems 
4.1. The Laws of Large Numbers 
The statistical probability pˆ  of the occurrence of an event can be 
determined by the results of independent trials, see formula (1.7), 
whereas its theoretical probability р is given by formula (1.1).  
We (§ 1.1.1) listed the shortcomings of that latter formula and only 
repeat now that it is rarely applicable since equally probable cases are 
often lacking. Consequently, we have to turn to statistical probability. 
    4.1.1. Jakob Bernoulli. Bernoulli (1713/2005, pp. 29 – 30) 
reasonably remarked that 
Even the most stupid person […] feels sure that the more […] 
observations are taken, the less is the danger of straying from the goal. 
Nevertheless, he (p. 30) continued: 
    It remains to investigate whether, when the number of observations 
increases, […] the probability of obtaining [the theoretical probability] 
continually augments so that it finally exceeds any given degree of 
certitude. Or [to the contrary …] that there exists such a degree of 
certainty which can never be exceeded no matter how the observations 
be multiplied.  
In other words, will the difference |р – pˆ | continually decrease or 
not so that the statistical probability will not be a sufficiently good 
estimate of р.  
Bernoulli proved that, in his restricted pattern, induction (trials) is 
(are) not worse than deduction: as n → ∞ the difference |р – pˆ | tends 
to disappear. His investigation opened up a new vast field. 
Nevertheless, not that difference itself, but its probability tends to zero. 
As n → ∞  
 
    lim P(|р – pˆ | < ε) = 1                                                     (4.1)  
 
with an arbitrarily small ε. This limit is exactly unity, not some lesser 
number, and induction is indeed not worse than deduction. But, 
wherever probabilities are involved, a fly appears in the ointment. The 
deviation of the statistical probability pˆ  from its theoretical 
counterpart can be considerable, even if rarely. A doubting Thomas 
can recall the example in § 1.2.3: the occurrence of an event with zero 
probability. Here, such an event is |р – pˆ | ≥ ε. The limit of probability 
essentially differs from the usual limit applied in other branches of 
mathematics. Nothing similar can happen there! 
    Formula (4.1) is called the (weak) law of large numbers (a term due 
to Poisson). There also exists the so-called strong law of large numbers 
which removes the described pitfall, but I do not discuss it.  
    Strictly speaking, Bernoulli wrote out formula (4.1) in a somewhat 
different way, then continued his investigation. He proved that the 
inequality 
 
    P(|р – pˆ | ≤ ε) ≥ 1 – δ, δ > 0 
 
will hold at given ε and δ as soon as n exceeds some N, which depends 
on those two numbers. He managed to determine how exactly N must 
increase with the tightening of the initial conditions.  
His investigation was not really successful: the demanded values of 
N had later been considerably decreased (Pearson 1924; Markov 1924, 
p. 46 ff) mostly because it became possible to apply the Stirling 
formula unknown to Bernoulli. True, neither did De Moivre (§ 4.2) 
know that formula, but he derived it (even a bit before Stirling). 
Mentioning Bernoulli’s crude estimates Pearson (1925) 
inadmissibly compared his law with the wrong Ptolemaic system of 
the world. He missed its great general importance and, in particular, 
paid no attention to Bernoulli’s existence theorem, of the very 
existence of the limit (4.1). It seems that Pearson did not set great store 
by such theorems.  
    In 1703 – 1705, before Bernoulli’s posthumous Ars Conjectandi 
appeared, Bernoulli had exchanged letters with Leibniz; the Latin text 
of their correspondence are partially translated into German (Gini 
1946; Kohli 1975); Bernoulli himself, without naming Leibniz, 
answered his criticisms in Chapter 4 of pt. 4 of his book. Leibniz did 
not believe that observations can ensure practical certainty and 
declared that the study of all the pertinent circumstances was more 
important than delicate calculations. Much later Mill (1843/1886, p. 
353) supported this point of view: 
    A very slight improvement of the data by better observations or by 
taking into fuller considerations the special circumstances of the case 
is of more use, than the most elaborate application of the calculus of 
probabilities founded on the [previous] data. 
He maintained that the neglect of that idea in applications to 
jurisprudence made the calculus of probability the real opprobrium of 
mathematics. Anyway, considerations of the circumstances and 
calculations do not exclude each other. 
In a letter of 1714 to one of his correspondents Leibniz (Kohli 1975, 
p. 512) softened his doubts about the application of the statistical 
probability and mistakenly added that the late Bernoulli had cultivated 
[the theory of probability] in accordance with his, Leibniz’, 
exhortations.  
    4.1.2. Poisson. Here is his qualitative definition of the law of large 
numbers (1837, p. 7):  
Les choses de toutes natures sont soumises à une loi universelle 
qu’on peut appeler la loi des grands nombres. Elle consiste en ce que, 
si l’on observe des nombres très considérables d’événements d’une 
même nature, dépendants de causes constantes et de causes qui 
varient irrégulièrement, tantôt dans un sens, tantôt dans l’autre, c’est-
à-dire sans que leur variation soit progressive dans aucun sens 
déterminé, on trouvera, entre ces nombres, des rapports à très peu 
près constantes. 
This is a diffuse definition of a principle rather than law. And here is 
a contemporary qualitative definition of that law (Gnedenko 1954, § 
30, p. 185): it is 
The entire totality of propositions stating with probability, 
arbitrarily close to unity, that there will occur some event depending 
on an indefinitely increasing number of random events each only 
slightly influencing it. 
The equality  
 
    lim P(|
μ
p
n
 | < ε) = 1, n → ∞                                      (4.2) 
 is now called the Poisson theorem. Here, µ/n is the frequency of an 
event in n independent trials and pk (from which x  is calculated) is the 
probability of its occurrence in trial k. Note that for the Bernoulli trials 
the probability of the occurrence of the studied event was constant (not 
pk but simply p). Unlike formula (4.1), the new equality is general and 
therefore much more applicable. 
4.1.3. Subsequent history. Chebyshev (1867) proved a more general 
theorem and Khinchin (1927) managed to generalize it still more. 
Finally, I provide another, not quite general formula for the law of 
large numbers: if  
 
    lim P(| ξ |n a  < ε) = 1, n → ∞, 
 
where a is some number, the sequence of magnitudes ξk obeys that law.  
4.2. The De Moivre – Laplace Theorem 
Suppose that a studied event occurs in each trial with probability р 
and does not occur with probability q, p + q = 1 and that in n such 
independent trials it happened µ times. Then, as n → ∞,  
 
    lim P(a ≤ 
2μ 1
) exp( )
22π
b
a
np z
b dz
npq

   .                   (4.3) 
 
In the limit, the binomial distribution thus becomes normal. This is 
what De Moivre proved in 1733 for the particular case of p = q = 1/2 
(in his notation, a = b = 1/2), but then he correctly stated that a 
transition to the general case is easy; furthermore, the heading of his 
(privately printed Latin) note mentioned the binomial (a + b)
n
. To 
recall, np = Eµ and npq = varµ. Note also that the formula (4.3) is a 
particular case of the central limit theorem (§ 2.2.4).  
    Like other mathematicians of his time, De Moivre applied 
expansions into divergent series, only took into account their first 
terms, and neglected all the subsequent terms as soon as they began to 
increase (as soon as the series really began to diverge). 
Laplace (1812, Chapter 3) derived the same formula (4.3) by means 
of a novelty, the Euler – Maclaurin summation formula. Furthermore, 
he added a term taking account of the inaccuracy occurring because of 
the unavoidable finiteness of n. Markov (1914/1951, p. 511), certainly 
somewhat mistakenly, called the integral after De Moivre and Laplace. 
That name persisted in Russian literature although, tacitly, in the 
correct way, as describing the integral theorem due to both those 
scholars. There also exists the corresponding local theorem  
 
    
21 (μ )
(μ) exp[ ].
22π
np
P
npqnpq

                                 (4.4) 
 
Assigning some µ in the right side of this formula and inserting the 
appropriate values of n, p, q, we will approximately calculate the 
probability of that µ. Exponential functions included in formulas (4.3) 
and (4.4) are tabulated in many textbooks. 
A few additional remarks. Formula (4.3) describes a uniform 
convergence with respect to a and b (those interested can easily find 
this term), but Laplace (or certainly De Moivre) did not yet know that 
notion. Again, strict inequalities had not been then distinguished from 
non-strict ones. In formula (4.3), we should now apply a strict 
inequality in the second case (… < b). Then, the convergence to the 
normal law worsens with the decrease of p or q from 1/2 which is seen 
in a contemporary proof of the theorem (Gnedenko 1954, § 13). 
   In 1738 De Moivre included his own English translation of his 
private note in the second edition of the Doctrine of Chances and 
reprinted it in an extended form in the last edition (1756) of that book. 
However, the English language was not generally known by scientists 
on the Continent and the proof of (4.3) was difficult to understand 
since English mathematicians had followed Newton in avoiding the 
symbol of integral. Finally, Todhunter (1865, p. 192 – 193), the most 
eminent historian of probability of the 19
th
 century, described the 
derivation of the formula (4.3) rather unsuccessfully and did not notice 
its importance. He even stated that De Moivre had only proved it for 
the particular case of p = q = 1/2. De Moivre’s theorem only became 
generally known by the end of the 19
th
 century. 
Already in 1730 De Moivre independently derived the Stirling 
formula; the latter only provided him the value of the constant, 2π . 
Both Pearson (1924) and Markov (1924, p. 55 note) justly remarked 
that the Stirling formula ought to be called after both authors. I 
additionally remark that in 1730 De Moivre had compiled a table (with 
one misprint) of lgn! for n = 10(10)900 with 14 decimal points; 11 or 
12 of them are correct. 
Suppose now that it is required to determine the probability of 
casting a six 7 times in 100 rolls of a die. We have р = 1/6 and n = 100, 
then np = 16.7 and npq  = 13.9. By formula (4.4) 
 
    P(µ = 7) ≈ 
21 (7 )
exp[ ].
22π
np
npqnpq

  
 
I have isolated the factor 2π  since the exponential function is 
tabulated together with 1/ 2π .  
Another point. In § 2.2.4 I mentioned that De Moivre had studied 
the sex ratio at birth. Now I say that exactly this subject (rather topical 
as the following shows) became the immediate cause for the derivation 
of formula (4.3).  
Arbuthnot (1712) collected the data on births (or rather on baptisms) 
in London during 1629 – 1710. He noted that during each of those 82 
years more boys had been born than girls and declared that that fact 
was not the effect of chance, but Divine Providence, working for a 
good end since mortality of boys and men was higher than that of 
females and since the probability of the observed fact was only (1/2)
–82
.  
His reasoning was not good enough but the problem itself proved 
extremely fruitful. Baptisms were not identical with births, London 
was perhaps an exception, Christians possibly somehow differed from 
other people and the comparative mortality of the sexes was not really 
studied. Then, by itself, an insignificant probability had not proved 
anything and it would have been much more natural to explain the data 
by a binomial distribution.  
In a letter of 1713 Nikolaus Bernoulli (Montmort 1708/1713, pp. 280 
– 285) had indeed introduced that distribution. Denote the yearly 
number of births by n, µ of them boys, the unknown sex ratio at birth 
by m/f and р = m/(m + f). Bernoulli indirectly derived the approximate 
equality (lacking in Bernoulli’s letter) 
 
    
2| μ |
( ) 1 exp[ ],
2
np s
P s
npq

     
 
where s had order √n, see Sheynin (1968; only in its reprint). He thus 
effectively arrived at the normal law much earlier than De Moivre. 
Youshkevich (1986) reported that three mathematicians concluded 
that Bernoulli had come close to the local theorem (4.4) although I 
somewhat doubt it and the very fact that three mathematicians had to 
study Bernoulli’s results testifies that these are difficult to interpret.  
The initial goal of the theory of probability consisted in separating 
chance and design. Indeed, Arbuthnot, Nikolaus Bernoulli and De 
Moivre pursued this very aim. The last-mentioned devoted the first 
edition of his Doctrine of Chances to Newton and reprinted this 
dedication in the third edition of that book (p. 329). He attempted to 
work out, to learn from Newton’s philosophy, 
A method of calculating the effects of chance [… and to fix] certain 
rules for estimating how far some sort of events may rather be owing 
to design rather than chance … 
Note that De Moivre then did not yet prove his limit theorem.  
4.3. The Bayes Limit Theorem 
    His main formula was (1764)  
 
P(b ≤ r ≤ c) = (1 )
c
p q
b
u u dx  ÷ 
1
0
(1 )p qu p dx .              (4.5) 
 
Bayes derived it by applying complicated logical constructions, but  
I interpret its conditions thus: given, a unit interval and segment [b;  
c] lying within it. Owing to complete ignorance (Scholium to 
Proposition 9), point r is situated with equal probability anywhere on 
that interval; in n = p + q trials that point occurred p times within [b; c] 
and q times beyond it.  
    In other words, Bayes derived the posterior distribution of a random 
variable having a uniform prior distribution. The denial of that 
assumption (of the uniform distribution) led to discussions about the 
Bayes memoir (§ 1.1.1-5). In addition, the situation of point r is not at 
all random but unknown. Thus, the formula (4.5) should not be applied 
for deriving the probability of a certain value of a remote digit in the 
expansion of π (Neyman 1938a/1967, p. 337). 
At that time there did not exist any clear notion of density; now, 
however, we may say that the formula (4.5) does not contradict its 
definition. Bayes derived the denominator of the formula and thus 
obtained the value of the beta-function (Euler). Both the pertinent 
calculation and the subsequent work were complicated and not easy to 
retrace. However, Timerding, the editor of the German version of 
Bayes’ memoir (1908), surmounted the difficulties involved. 
Moreover, he invented a clever trick and wrote out the result as a limit 
theorem. For large р and q he arrived at  
 
    limP(
2
3
/ 1
) exp( ) 
22π/
b
a
p p n z
a b dz
pq n

    , n → ∞.      (4.6)  
 
Here p  is a statistical estimate of the unknown probability р that 
point r is within [b; c], and 3/ E ,  / var .p n p pq n p    
    A comparison of the formulas (4.3) and (4.5) convinces us that they 
describe the behaviour of differing random variables 
 
    
ξ  Eξ
varξ
i i
i

, i = 1 (De Moivre), i = 2 (Bayes). 
 
The variance in the Bayes formula is larger. The proof is not really 
needed; indeed, statistical data are present in both cases, but additional 
information (the theoretical probability) is only given in formula (4.3). 
And it is extremely interesting that Bayes, who had no idea about the 
notion of variance, understood that the De Moivre formula did not 
describe good enough the determination of that theoretical probability 
by its statistical counterpart. Both Jakob Bernoulli and De Moivre 
mistakenly stated the opposite, but Price, an eminent statistician who 
communicated (and extended) the posthumous Bayes memoir, 
mentioned this circumstance.  
    But why did not Bayes himself represent his result as a limit 
theorem? In another posthumous contribution of the same year, 1784, 
Bayes clearly indicated, for the first time ever, that the application of 
divergent series (in particular, by De Moivre) is fraught with danger. 
Timerding, it ought to be remarked, managed to avoid them. Note 
however that such series are still cautiously applied.  
I believe that Bayes had completed the first version of the theory of 
probability which included the Jakob Bernoulli law of large numbers 
and the theorems due to De Moivre and Bayes himself. In addition, 
Bayes was actually the main predecessor of Mises (which the latter 
never acknowledged). See also Sheynin (2010b). 
 
Chapter 5. Random Processes. Markov Chains 
5.1. Random Functions 
    Random functions are random variables changing discretely or 
continuously in time; for example, unavoidable noise occurring during 
the work of many instruments. Fixing some definite moment, we 
obtain the corresponding random variable, a section of a random 
function.  
    The law of distribution of a random function is naturally a function 
of two arguments one of which is time. For this reason the expectation 
of a random function is not a number but a (usual rather than a random) 
function. When fixing the moment of time, the expectation will pertain 
to the corresponding section of the random function and a similar 
statement concerns the variance. Another new point has to do with the 
addition of dependent random functions: the notion of correlation 
ought to be generalized.  
   A random function without after-effect is such for which there exists 
a definite probability of its transferring from a certain state to another 
one in such a way that additional information about previous situations 
does not change that probability. A good example is the Brownian 
motion (discovered by the English botanist Brown in 1827), the 
motion of tiny particles in a liquid under the influence of molecular 
forces.  
    About half a century ago, a new important phenomenon, the chaotic 
motion differing from random motion, began to be studied. However 
complicated and protracted is a coin toss, its outcomes do not change 
and neither do their probabilities. Chaotic motion, on the other hand, 
involves a rapid increase of its initial instability (of the unavoidable 
errors in the initial conditions) with time and countless positions of its 
possible paths.  
It was Laplace (1781; 1812, § 15) who introduced subjective 
opinions (end of § 1.1.1-6) and, actually, a random process. Suppose 
that some interval is separated into equal or unequal parts and 
perpendiculars are erected from their ends. Let there be i 
perpendiculars, their total length unity, forming a non-increasing 
sequence in one of the two directions. Their ends are connected by a 
broken line and a proper number of curves, and all this construction is 
repeated n times after which the mean values of the current 
perpendiculars are calculated. 
Laplace supposes that the lengths of the perpendiculars are assigned 
by n different people and that the worth of candidates or the 
significance of various causes can thus be ordered in a non-increasing 
order. Each curve can be considered a random function; their set, a 
random process; and the mean curve, its expectation. True, the 
calculations occurred very complicated.  
Evolution according to Darwin provides a second example. Consider 
a totality of individuals of, say, the male sex, of some species. Each 
individual can be theoretically characterised by the size of its body and 
body parts; the unimaginable multitude n of such sizes is of no 
consequence. Introduce the usual definition of distance in an n-
dimensional space and each individual will be represented by its point. 
The same space will contain the point or the subspace U of the sizes 
optimal for the chosen species. In the next generation, the offspring of 
any parents will be the better adapted to life the nearer they are to U 
which means that, in spite of the random scattering of the offspring 
around their midparents (a term due to Pearson), one generation after 
another will in general move towards U. However, that U will also 
move according to the changes in our surrounding world (and, if that 
movement is too rapid, the species can disappear). And so, individuals 
remote from U will in general perish or leave less offspring and our 
entire picture can be understood as a discrete random process with 
sections represented by each generation. 
Our pattern is only qualitative; indeed, we do not know any numbers, 
any probabilities, for example, the probability of the mating of two 
given individuals of different sexes and we are therefore ignorant of 
any information about their offspring. Moreover, Darwin reasonably 
set great store by the habits of animals about which we are ignorant as 
well. Finally, there exists correlation between body parts of an 
individual. Darwin himself (1859/1958, p. 77) actually compared his 
theory (or, rather, hypothesis) with a random process: 
Throw up a handful of feathers, and all fall to the ground according 
to definite laws; but how simple is the problem where each shall fall 
compared with problems in the evolution of species.  
Opponents of evolution mostly cited the impossibility of its being 
produced by chance, by uniform randomness which once again 
showed that for a very long time that distribution had been considered 
as the only one describing randomness. Baer (1873, p. 6) and 
Danilevsky (1885, pt. 1, p. 194) independently mentioned the 
philosopher depicted in Gulliver’s Travels (but borrowed by Swift 
form Raymond Lully, 13
th
 – 14th centuries). That inventor, hoping to 
learn all the truths, was putting on record each sensible chain of words 
that appeared from among their uniformly random arrangements. Note 
that even such randomness does not exclude the gradual movement of 
the generations to U (but the time involved will perhaps be enormous). 
    Evolution began to be studied anew after Mendel’s laws have been 
unearthed (after about 40 years of disregard) and, once more anew, 
after the important role of mutations has been understood. 
5.2. Markov Chains (Processes with Discrete Time) 
Suppose that one and only one of the events ( ) ( ) ( )1 2,  ,...,  
s s s
kA A A  
occurs in trial s and that in the next trial the (conditional) probability 
of event ( 1)siA
  depends on what happened in event s, but not on those 
preceding s. These conditions, if fulfilled in any trial, determine a 
homogeneous Markov chain.  
Denote the conditional probability of 
( 1)s
jA

 as depending on ( )siA  by 
pij, then the process described by such chain is determined by a square 
matrix (table) of such probabilities, the transition matrix. Its first row 
is p11, p12, …, p1k, the second one, p21, p22, …, p2k, …, and the last one, 
pk1, pk2, …, pkk, and the sum of the probabilities, the transition 
probabilities, in each row is unity.  
    It is possible to construct at once both a transition matrix for n trials 
and the limiting matrix which exists (that is, the corresponding 
limiting probabilities exist) if for some s all the elements of the matrix 
are positive. Markov derived this result and discovered some other 
findings which were later called ergodic theorems. In particular, it 
occurred that under certain conditions all the limiting probabilities are 
identical. 
    This remarkable property can explain, for example, the uniform 
distribution of the small planets along the ecliptic: a reference to these 
limiting probabilities which do not depend on the initial probabilities 
would have been sufficient. Actually, however, the small planets 
(more precisely, all planets) move along elliptical orbits and in 
somewhat differing planes.  
Poincaré (1896/1987, p. 150), who had not referred to any Russian  
author, not even to Laplace or Poisson, justified this fact although in a 
complicated way. (Also, by introducing hypercomplex numbers, he 
proved that after a lot of shuffling the positions of the cards in a pack 
tended to become equally probable.)  
Markov himself only applied his results to investigate the 
alternation of consonants and vowels in the Russian language 
(Petruszewycz 1983). He possibly obeyed his own restriction (Ondar 
1977/1981, p. 59, Markov’s letter to Chuprov of 1910):  
I shall not go a step out of that region where my competence is 
beyond any doubt. 
The term itself, Markov chain, first appeared (in French) in 1926 
(Bernstein 1926, first line of § 16) and pertained to Markov’s 
investigations of 1906 – 1913. Some related subjects are Brownian 
motion, extinction of families, financial speculation, random walk. 
The urn problem discussed below can be understood as a (one-
dimensional) random walk, as a discrete movement of a particle in one 
or another direction along some straight line with the probabilities p 
and q of movement depending on what had happened in the previous 
discrete moment. Diffusion is a similar but three-dimensional process, 
but a random walk with constant р and q, like the walk of the number 
of winnings of one of the two gamblers in a series of games, is not 
anymore a Markov chain. 
And so, we will discuss the urn problem of Daniel Bernoulli (1770) 
and Laplace which is identical to the celebrated Ehrenfests’ model 
(1907) considered as the beginning of the history of discrete random 
processes, or Markov chains. The first urn contains n white balls, the 
second urn, the same number of black balls. Required is the (expected) 
number of white balls in the first urn after r cyclic interchanges of a 
ball.  
In his second problem Bernoulli generalized the first by considering 
three urns and balls of three colours. He managed to solve it elegantly, 
and discovered the limiting situation, an equal (expected) number of 
balls of each colour in each urn. A simplest method of confirming this 
result consists in a reference to the appropriate ergodic theorem for 
homogeneous Markov chains, but first we should prove that this 
Bernoulli problem fits the pattern of that theorem. It is not difficult. 
Indeed, for example, in the case of two urns, four events are possible at 
each interchange and the probability of each event changes depending 
on the results of the previous interchange. These four events are: white 
balls were extracted from each urn; a white ball was extracted from the 
first urn and a black ball from the second etc.  
Laplace (1812, chapter 3) generalized the Bernoulli problem (but did 
not refer to him) by admitting an arbitrary initial composition of the 
urns, then (1814/1886, p. LIV) adding that new urns are placed 
amongst the original urns, again with an arbitrary distribution of the 
balls. He (p. LV) concluded, probably too optimistically, that 
On peut étendre ces résultats à toutes les combinaisons de la nature, 
dans lesquelles les forces constantes dont leurs éléments sont animés 
établissent des modes réguliers d’action, propres à faire éclore du sein 
même du chaos des systèmes régis des lois admirables.  
 
Chapter 6. The Theory of Errors  
and the Method of Least Squares 
6.1. The Theory of Errors 
This term (in German) is due to Lambert (1765, § 321). It only 
became generally used in the middle of the next century; neither 
Laplace, nor Gauss ever applied it although Bessel did. The theory of 
errors studies errors of observation and their treatment so that the 
method of least squares (MLSq) belongs to it. I have separated that 
method owing to its importance. 
The theory of errors can be separated into a stochastic and a 
determinate part. The former studies random errors and their influence 
on the results of measurements, the action of the round-off errors and, 
the dependence between obtained relations. The latter investigates the 
patterns of measurement for a given order of errors and studies 
methods of excluding systematic errors (or minimizing their influence). 
Denote a random error by ξ, its expectation will then be Еξ = 0. 
Otherwise (as it really is) ξ is not a purely random error and Еξ = а is 
the systematic error. It shifts the even density of random errors either 
to the right (if а > 0), or to the left (if а < 0).  
From 1756 (Simpson, § 1.2.3) until the 1920s the stochastic theory 
of errors, as stated there, had remained the most important field of 
application of the theory of probability. In a posthumous publication 
Poincaré(1921/1983, p. 343) noted that La théorie des erreurs était 
naturellement mon principal but and Lévy (1925, p. vii) strongly 
indicated that without the theory of errors his contribution on stable 
laws n’aurait pas de raison d’être. 
Stable laws became an essential notion of the theory of probability, 
but for the theory of errors they are absolutely useless. As a corollary 
to the definition of a stable law it follows that the sum ∑ξi and the 
arithmetic mean ξ  have the same distribution as the independent and 
identically distributed random variables ξi, and Lévy proved that a real 
estimation of the precision of those functions of random variables, if 
their distribution is not stable, is very difficult. However, an observer 
can never know whether the errors of his measurements obey a stable 
law or not. Moreover, the Cauchy law is also stable, but does not 
possess any variance (§ 2.3.2). 
In turn, mathematical statistics took over the principles of maximal 
likelihood and least variance (see § 6.3 below) from the stochastic 
theory of errors. 
    Now the determinate theory of errors. Hipparchus and Ptolemy 
could not have failed to be ignorant about them (in the first place, 
about those caused by the vertical refraction). Nevertheless, it was 
Daniel Bernoulli (1780) who first clearly distinguished random and 
systematic errors although only in a particular case. 
Also in antiquity astronomers had been very successfully observing 
under the most favourable conditions. A good example is an 
observation of the planets during their stations, that is, during the 
change of their apparent direction of motion, when an error in 
registering some definite moment least influences the results of 
subsequent calculations. Indeed, 
One the most admirable features of ancient astronomy [was] that all 
efforts were concentrated upon reducing to a minimum the influence of 
the inaccuracy of  individual observations with crude instruments by 
developing […] the mathematical consequences of very few elements 
[of optimal circumstances] (Neugebauer 1950/1983, p. 250). 
    Actually, however, the determinate theory of errors originated with 
the differential calculus. Here is a simplest geodetic problem. Two 
angles, α and β, and side а are measured in a triangle and the order of 
error of these elements is known. Required is the order of error in the 
other (calculated) elements of the triangle, and thus the determination 
of the optimal form of the triangle.  
Denote the length of any of the calculated sides by W. It is a 
function of the measurements:  
 
    W = f(a; α; β), 
 
and its differential, approximately equal to its error, is calculated by 
standard formulas. 
    From studying isolated geodetic figures the determinate theory 
moved to investigating chains and even nets of triangles. And here is a 
special problem showing the wide scope of that theory (Bessel 1839). 
A measuring bar several feet in length is supported at two points 
situated at equal distances from its middle. The bar’s weight changes 
its length and the amount of change depends on the position of the 
supporting points. Where exactly should you place these points so that 
the bar’s length will be least corrupted? Bessel solved this problem by 
means of appropriate differential equations. For a contemporary civil 
engineer such problems are usual, but Bessel was likely the first in this 
area. 
Gauss and Bessel originated a new stage in experimental science. 
Indeed, Newcomb (Schmeidler 1984, pp. 32 – 33) mentioned the 
German school of practical astronomy but mistakenly only connected 
it with Bessel. True, the appropriate merits of Tycho Brahe are not 
known adequately. Newcomb continued:  
Its fundamental idea was that the instrument is indicted […] for 
every possible fault, and not exonerated till it has proved itself  
corrected in every point. The methods of determining the possible 
errors of an instrument were developed by Bessel with ingenuity and 
precision of geometric method … 
    Gauss had detected the main systematic errors of geodetic 
measurements (those caused by lateral refraction, by the errors of 
graduating the limbs of the theodolites, and inherent in some methods 
of measurement) and outlined the means for eliminating/decreasing 
them. 
    For a more detailed description of this subject see Sheynin (1996, 
Chapter 9).  
6.2. The True Value of a Measured Constant 
Many sciences and scientific disciplines have to measure constants; 
metrology ought to be mentioned here in the first place. But what 
should we understand as a true value of a constant? Is it perhaps a 
philosophical term? 
Fourier (1826) suggested its definition undoubtedly recognized 
earlier even if tacitly: the true value of a constant is the limit of the 
arithmetic mean of its n measurements as n → ∞. It is easy to see that 
the Mises’ frequentist definition of probability (§ 1.1.3) is akin to 
Fourier’s proposal. The measurements can be carried out under 
identical conditions as is really essential for metrology but this is 
inadmissible in geodesy: differing (but good enough) external 
conditions were necessary for some compensation of systematic errors.  
    I failed to find a single reference to his definition but many authors 
repeated it independently from him or one another. One of them 
(Eisenhart 1963/1969, p. 31) formulated the unavoidable corollary: the 
mean residual systematic error had to be included in the true value: 
    The mass of a mass standard is […] specified […] to be the mass of 
the metallic substance of the standard plus the mass of the average 
volume of air adsorbed upon its surface under standard conditions. 
Statisticians have done away with true values and introduced instead 
parameters of densities (or distribution functions) and their properties. 
A transition to more abstract notions is a step in the right direction (cf. 
end of § 1.2.3), but they still have to mention true values; Gauss (1816, 
§§ 3 и 4) even discussed the true value of a measure of error, of 
something not existing in nature. For more detail see Sheynin (2007). 
6.3. The Method of Least Squares 
    This standard method of treating observations is usually regarded as 
a chapter of mathematical statistics rather than probability. 
Suppose that the unknown constants х and у are connected with 
observations w1, w2, …, wn by linear equations 
 
    aix + biy + … + wi = 0, i = 1, 2, …, n.                                 (6.1) 
 
In the general case the number of the unknowns, k, is arbitrary, but if 
k > n, the solution of (6.1) is impossible, and if k = n, no special 
methods of its solution are needed. Therefore, k < n. The coefficients 
ai, bi, … ought to be provided by the appropriate theory, and the 
system (6.1) can be supposed linear if the unknowns are small.  
Indeed. Suppose that a system is not linear and that its first equation 
is 
 
a1x
2
 + b1y
2
 + w1 = 0. 
 
We actually know the approximate value of the unknowns, x0 and y0, 
so that, for example, the first term of our equation is a1(x0 + Δx)
2
 with 
an unknown small Δx. The term (Δx)2 can be neglected and that first 
term will be a1(x0
2
 + 2x0Δx). The unknown magnitude is now linear, 
2a1x0Δx, and the second term of our equation, b1y
2
, can be linearized 
in a similar way. A similar procedure is easily explained in case of 
trigonometric coefficients which is important for astronomy.  
    And now the main question: how to solve the system (6.1)? 
Observations are supposed to be independent (or almost so) and 
rejecting the (n – k) redundant equations (which exactly?) would have 
been tantamount to rejecting worthy observations. A strict solution is 
impossible: any set (x, y, …) will leave some residual free terms (call 
them vi). We are therefore obliged to impose one or another condition 
on these residuals. It became most usual to choose the condition of 
least squares  
 
    v1
2
 + v2
2
 + … + vn
2
 = min,                                          (6.2) 
 
hence the name, MLSq. And 
 
    2iv  = (ai x + bi y + … + wi)
2
. 
 
We ought to determine the values of х, у, …, leading to condition 
(6.2), and these unknowns are therefore considered here as variables. 
We have 
 
    
2
iv
x



 2ai(ai x + bi y + … + wi). 
 
According to the standard procedure,  
 
    
22 2
1 2 ... n
vv v
x x x
 
  
  
 = 2∑(aiaix + aibiy + … + aiwi) = 0, 
 
so that, applying the Gauss elegant notation (§ 2.3.2), 
  
    [aa]x + [ab]y + … + [aw] = 0. 
 
Differentiating 2iv  with respect to у, we similarly get 
 
    [ab]x + [bb]y + … + [bw] = 0. 
 
The derived equations are called normal, and it is clear that their 
number coincides with the number of the unknowns (yes, they became 
again unknown); the system of normal equations can therefore be 
solved in any usual way. Note, however, that the solution provides a 
certain set ˆ ˆ, ,...x y , a set of estimators of {x, y, …}, of magnitudes 
which will remain unknown. Even the unknowns of the system of 
normal equations already are ˆ ˆ, ,...x y  rather than x, y, … It is also 
necessary to estimate the errors of ˆ ˆ, ,...x y , but we leave that problem 
aside.  
    Condition (6.2) ensures valuable properties to those estimators 
(Petrov 1954). It corresponds to the condition of minimal variance, to 
 
    m
2
 = 
2 2 2
1 2 ... min.n
v v v
n k
  


                                             (6.3) 
 
The denominator is the number of redundant observations; the same is 
true for the formula (2.12) which corresponds to the case of one single 
unknown. For this case system (6.1) becomes simpler, 
 
    aix + wi = 0, 
 
and it is easy to verify that it leads to the generalized arithmetic mean. 
Classical systems (6.1) had two unknown parameters of the ellipsoid 
of rotation best representing the figure of the Earth. After determining 
the length of one degree of a meridian in two different and observed 
latitudes it became possible to calculate those parameters whereas 
redundant meridian arc measurements led to equations of the type of 
(6.1). They served as a check of field measurements, they also 
heightened the precision of the final result (and to some extent 
compensated local irregularities of the figure of the Earth).  
The lengths of such arcs in differing latitudes were certainly 
different and thus indicated the deviation of that figure from a 
circumference.  
Legendre (1805, pp. 72 – 73; 1814) recommended the MLSq 
although only justifying it by reasonable considerations. Moreover, he 
(as also Laplace) mistakenly called the vi ’s errors of measurements 
and, finally, according to the context of his recommendation, he 
thought that the MLSq led to the minimal value of the maximal |vi|. 
Actually, this condition is ensured by the method of minimax, see § 6.4.  
    Gauss had applied the MLSq from 1794 or 1795 and mistakenly 
thought that it had been known long ago. In general, Gauss did not 
hurry to publish his discoveries; he rather connected priority with the 
finding itself. He (1809, § 186) therefore called the MLSq unser 
Princip which deeply insulted Legendre. Note, however, that, unlike 
Legendre, Gauss had justified the new method (but later substantiated 
it in a different way since then, in 1809, the normal law became the 
only law of error).  
    As I see it, Legendre could have simply stated in some subsequent 
contribution that no one will agree that Gauss was the author of the 
MLSq. However, French mathematicians including Poisson (see below 
a few words about Laplace) sided with Legendre’s opinion and, to 
their own great disadvantage, ignored Gauss’ contributions on least 
squares and the theory of errors.  
Much later Gauss (letter to Bessel of 1839; Werke, Bd. 8, pp. 146 – 
147) explained his new attitude towards the MLSq: 
Ich muß es nämlich in alle Wege für weniger wichtig halten, 
denjenigen Wert einer unbekannten Größe auszumitteln, dessen 
Wahrscheinlichkeit die größte ist, die ja doch immer unendlich klein 
bleibt, als vielmehr denjenigen, an welchen sich haltend man das am 
wenigsten nachteilige Spiel hat.  
In other words, an integral measure of reliability (the variance) is 
preferable to the principle of maximal likelihood which he applied in 
1809. Then, in 1809, Gauss did not refer either to Lambert (1760, § 
295) or to Daniel Bernoulli (1778). The former was the first to 
recommend that principle for an indefinite density distribution. He had 
only graphically shown that density; it was a more or less symmetrical 
unimodal curve of the type φ(х – xˆ ), where xˆ  can be understood as a 
location parameter. For observations х1, х2, …, хn Lambert 
recommended to derive xˆ  from the condition (of maximum likelihood 
nowadays applied in mathematical statistics) 
 
    φ(х1 – xˆ ) φ(х2 – xˆ ) … φ(хn – xˆ ) = max. 
 
    So Gauss assumed that the arithmetic mean of observations was at 
the same time the most probable (in the sense of maximum likelihood) 
estimator and discovered that only the normal distribution followed 
from this assumption.  
In 1823 Gauss published his second and final justification of the 
MLSq by the principle of minimal variance (see above his letter to 
Bessel of 1839). Unlike his considerations in 1809, his reasoning 
which led him to equations (6.2) was very complicated whereas the 
law of error was indeed more or less normal. Thus, Maxwell (1860) 
proved (non-rigorously) that the distribution of gas velocities 
appropriate to a gas in equilibrium was normal; Quetelet (1853, pp. 64 
– 65) maintained that the normal law governed the errors faites par la 
nature.  
No wonder that Gauss’ first formulation of the MLSq persisted (and 
perhaps is still persisting) in spite of his opinion. I (2012) noticed, 
however, that Gauss actually derived formula (6.3) as representing the 
minimal value of the (sample) variance independently from his 
complicated considerations and that, when taking this into account, his 
memoir (1823) becomes much easier to understand. And facts showing 
that the normal law was not universal in nature continued to multiply 
so that that memoir should be considered much more important. 
    The first serious opponent of the normal law was Newcomb (1886, 
p. 343) who argued that the cases of normal errors were quite 
exceptional. For treating long series of observations he recommended 
a mixture of differing normal laws, but the calculations proved 
complicated whereas his pattern involved subjective decisions. 
Later Eddington (1933, § 5) proved that that mixture was not stable. 
    Bessel (1818) discussed Bradley’s series of 300 observations and 
could have well doubted the existence of an appropriate normal law. 
He noticed that large errors had appeared there somewhat more often 
than expected but somehow explained it away by the insufficient (!) 
number of observations. Much later he (1838) repeated his mistake. I 
(2000) noted many other mistakes and even absurdities in his 
contributions. 
    Unlike other French mathematicians, Laplace objectively described 
Legendre’s complaint: he was the first to publish the MLSq, but Gauss 
had applied it much earlier. However, Laplace never recognized the 
utmost importance of Gauss’ second substantiation of the method. 
Instead, he persisted in applying and advocating his own version of 
substantiating it. He proved several versions of the central limit 
theorem (CLT) (§ 2.2.4), certainly, non-rigorously (which was quite 
understandable) and very carelessly listing its conditions, then 
declared that the errors of observation were therefore normal. Laplace 
(1814/1886, p. LX) maintained that his finding was applicable in 
astronomy where long series of observations are made; cf., however, 
Newcomb’s opinion above. Then he (1816/1886, p. 536) stated that 
the CLT holds in geodesy since, as it followed from his reasoning, the 
order of two main errors inherent in geodetic observations have been 
equalized. Here again he did not really take into account the conditions 
of that theorem. 
    Markov’s work on the MLSq has been wrongly discussed. Neyman 
(1934) attributed to him Gauss’ second justification of 1823 which 
even until our time (Dodge 2003, p. 161) is sometimes called after 
both Gauss and Markov. David & Neyman (1938) repeated the latter’s 
mistake but the same year Neyman (1938b/1952, p. 228) corrected 
himself. 
Then, Linnik et al (1951, p. 637) maintained that Markov had in 
essence introduced concepts identical to the modern notions of 
unbiased and effective statistics. Without explaining that latter notion I 
simply note that these authors should have replaced Markov by Gauss. 
    Markov (1899) upheld the second justification of the MLSq perhaps 
much more resolutely than his predecessors (the first such opinion 
appeared in 1825). However, he (1899/1951, p. 246) depreciated 
himself: 
    I consider [that justification] rational since it does not obscure the 
conjectural essence of the method. […] We do not ascribe the ability 
of providing the most probable or the most plausible results to the 
method … 
Such a method does not need any justification. Furthermore, the 
MLSq does have optimal properties (Petrov 1954, cited above as well). 
Also see Sheynin (2006). 
6.4. The Minimax Method 
    There also exist other methods of solving systems (6.1). They do not 
lead to the useful properties of the MLSq estimators but are expedient 
in some cases. And there also exists a special method leading to the 
least absolute value of the maximal residual  
 
    |vmax| = min.                                                                   (6.4) 
 
    Least means least among all possible solutions (and therefore sets of 
vi’s); in the simplest case, among several reasonable solutions. The 
minimax method does not belong to probability theory, does not lead 
to any best results, but it allows to make definite conclusions. 
Recall that the coefficients ai, bi, … in system (6.1) are given by the 
appropriate theory and ask yourselves: do the observations wi confirm 
it? After determining ˆ ˆ, ,...x y  (this notation does not infer the MLSq 
anymore) we may calculate the residual free terms vi and determine 
whether they are not too large as compared with the known order of 
errors. In such cases we ought to decide whether the theory was wrong 
or that the observations were substandard. And here the minimax 
method is important: if even condition (6.4) leads to inadmissible |vi|, 
our doubts are certainly justified. 
Both Euler and Laplace had applied the minimax method (the latter 
had devised an appropriate algorithm) for establishing whether the 
accomplished meridian arc measurements denied the ellipticity of the 
figure of the Earth. Kepler (1609/1992, p. 334/143) could have well 
applied elements of that method for justifying his rejection of the 
Ptolemaic system of the world: the Tychonian observations were 
sufficiently precise but did not agree with it. In astronomy, equations 
are neither linear, nor even algebraic, and Kepler had to surmount 
additional difficulties (irrespective of the method of their solution).  
    Condition (6.4) is identical to having  
 
    lim( 2 2 21 2 ... )
k k k
nv v v   = min, k → ∞,  
 
which is almost obvious. Indeed, suppose that |v1| is maximal. Then, as 
k → ∞, all the other terms of the sum can be neglected. For arriving at 
a minimal value of the sum, 21
kv , and therefore |v1| also, should be as 
small as possible. 
    Without looking before he leapt, Stigler(1986, pp. 27, 28) 
confidently declared that Euler’s work (see above) was a statistical 
failure since he 
    Distrusted the combination of equations, taking the mathematician’s 
view that errors actually increase with aggregation rather than taking 
the statistician’s view that random errors tend to cancel one another. 
    However, at the turn of the 18
th
 century Laplace, Legendre and other 
scientists refusa de compenser les angles of a triangulation chain 
between two bases. Being afraid of corrupting the measured angles by 
adjusting them, they resolved to calculate each half of the chain from 
its own base (and somehow to adjust the common side of both parts of 
the triangulation), see Méchain & Delambre (1810, pp. 415 – 433).  
Later, in the Third Supplement to his Théorie analytique, Laplace (ca. 
1819/1886, pp. 590 – 591) explained that decision by the lack of the 
vraie théorie which he (rather than Gauss whom he had not mentioned) 
had since created. See also Sheynin (1993а, p. 50). 
In the Soviet Union, separate triangulation chains were included in 
the general adjustment of the entire network only after preliminarily 
adjustment (§ 1.1.4). This pattern was necessary since otherwise the 
work would have been impossible. In addition, the influence of the 
systematic errors should have been restricted to separate chains (as 
stated in a lecture of ca. 1950 of an eminent Soviet geodesist, A. A. 
Isotov), and this consideration was akin to the decision of the French 
scientists described above. 
 
Chapter 7. Theory of Probability, Statistics, Theory of Errors 
7.1. Axiomatization of the Theory of Probability 
    Following many previous author, I noted (§ 1.1.1) that the 
classical definition of probability is unsatisfactory and that Hilbert 
(1901/1970, p. 306) recommended to axiomatize the theory of 
probability: 
Durch die Untersuchungen über die Grundlagen der Geometrie 
wird uns die Aufgabe nahe gelegt, nach diesem Vorbilds diejenigen 
physikalischen Disziplinen axiomatisch zu behandeln, in denen schon 
heute die Mathematik eine hervorragende Rolle spielt: dies sind in 
erster Linie die Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung und die Mechanik. 
The theory of probability had then still been an applied 
mathematical (but not physical) discipline. In the next lines of his 
report Hilbert mentioned the method of mean values. That method or 
theory had been an intermediate entity divided between statistics and 
the theory of errors, and Hilbert was one of the last scholars (the last 
one?) to mention it, see Sheynin (2007, pp. 44 – 46). 
Boole (1854/1952, p. 288) indirectly forestalled Hilbert: 
The claim to rank among the pure sciences must rest upon the 
degree in which it [the theory of probability] satisfies the following 
conditions: 1° That the principles upon which its methods are founded 
should be of an axiomatic nature. 
Boole formulated two more conditions, both of a general scientific 
nature. Attempts to axiomatize the theory began almost at once after 
Hilbert’s report. However, as generally recognized, only Kolmogorov 
attained quite satisfactory results. Without discussing the essence of 
his work (see for example Gnedenko 1954, § 8 in chapter 1), I quote 
his general statements (1933, pp. III and 1): 
    Der leitende Gedanke des Verfassers war dabei, die Grundbegriffe 
der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, welche noch unlängst für ganz 
eigenartig galten, natürlicherweise in die Reihe der allgemeinen 
Begriffsbildungen der modernen Mathematik einzuordnen. 
 
Die Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie als mathematische Disziplin soll 
und kann genau in demselben Sinne axiomatisiert werden wie die 
Geometrie oder die Algebra. Das bedeutet, daß, nachdem die Namen 
der zu untersuchenden Gegenstände und ihrer Grundbeziehungen 
sowie die Axiome, denen diese Grundbeziehungen zu gehorchen haben, 
angegeben sind, die ganze weitere Darstellung sich ausschließlich auf 
diese Axiome gründen soll und keine Rücksicht auf die jeweilige 
konkrete Bedeutung dieser Gegenstände und Beziehungen nehmen 
darf.  
For a long time these ideas had not been generally recognized 
(Doob 1989; 1994, p. 593): 
    To most mathematicians mathematical probability was to 
mathematics as black marketing to marketing; […] The confusion 
between probability and the phenomena to which it is applied […] still 
plagues the subject; [the significance of the Kolmogorov monograph] 
was not appreciated for years, and some mathematicians sneered that 
[…] perhaps probability needed rigor, but surely not rigor mortis; […] 
The role of measure theory in probability […] still embarrasses some 
who like to think that mathematical probability is not a part of analysis.  
 
    It was some time before Kolmogorov’s basis was accepted by 
probabilists. The idea that a (mathematical) random variable is simply 
a function, with no romantic connotation, seemed rather humiliating to 
some probabilists … 
    For a long time Hausdorff’s merits had remained barely known. His 
treatise on the set theory (1914, pp. 416 – 417) included references to 
probability, but much more was contained in his manuscripts, see 
Girlich (1996) and Hausdorff (2006). I also mention Markov (1924). 
On p. 10 he stated a curious axiom and on p. 24 referred to it (without 
really thinking how the readers will manage to find it):  
    Axiom. [Not separated from general text!] If […] events p, q, r, …, u, 
v are equally possible and divided with respect to event A into 
favourable and unfavourable, then, [if] A has occurred, [those] which 
are unfavourable to event A fall through, whereas the others remain 
equally possible …  
 
The addition and multiplication theorems along with the axiom 
mentioned above serve as an unshakeable base for the calculus of 
probability as a chapter of pure mathematics. 
    His axiom and statement have been happily forgotten although he 
had a predecessor. Donkin (1851) had introduced a similar axiom but 
did not claim to change the status of probability theory and Boole 
(1854/2003, p. 163) positively mentioned him.    
Shafer & Vovk (2001) offered their own axiomatization, possibly 
very interesting but demanding some financial knowledge. They (2003, 
p. 27) had explained their aim: 
[In our book] we show how the classical core of probability theory 
can be based directly on game-theoretic martingales, with no appeal 
to measure theory. Probability again becomes [a] secondary concept 
but is now defined in terms of martingales … 
    Barone & Novikoff (1978) and Hochkirchen (1999) described the 
history of the axiomatization of probability. The latter highly estimated 
an unpublished lecture of Hausdorff read in 1923. 
7.2. Definitions and Explanations 
    As understood nowadays, statistics originated in political arithmetic 
(Petty, Graunt, mid-17
th
 century). It quantitatively (rather than 
qualitatively) studied population, economics and trade, discussed the 
appropriate causes and connections and applied simplest stochastic 
considerations. Here is a confirmation (Kendall 1960): 
Statistics, as we now understand the term, did not commence until 
the 17
th
 century, and then not in the field of ‘statistics’ 
[Staatswissenschaft]. The true ancestor of modern statistics is […] 
Political Arithmetic. 
Statistics had gradually, and especially since the second half of the 
19
th
 century, begun to penetrate various branches of natural sciences. 
This led to the appearance of the term statistical method although we 
prefer to isolate three stages of its development.  
    At first, conclusions were being based on (statistically) noticed 
qualitative regularities, a practice which conformed to the qualitative 
essence of ancient science. See the statements of Hippocrates (§ 3.1) 
and Celsus (§ 1.1.3).  
The second stage (Tycho in astronomy, Graunt in demography and 
medical statistics) was distinguished by the availability of statistical 
data. Scientists had then been arriving at important conclusions either 
by means of simple stochastic ideas and methods or even directly, as 
before. A remarkable example is the finding of an English physician 
Snow (1855/1965, pp. 58 – 59) who compared mortality from cholera 
for two groups of the London population, of those whose drinking 
water was (somehow) purified or not. Purification decreased mortality 
by 8 times and he thus discovered the way in which cholera epidemics 
had been spreading.  
During the present stage, which dates back to the end of the 19
th
 
century, inferences are being checked by quantitative stochastic rules. 
The questions listed by Moses (Numbers 13:17 – 20) can also be 
attributed to that first stage (and to political arithmetic): he sent scouts 
to spy out the land of Canaan, to find out  
whether the people who dwell in it are strong or weak, whether they 
are few or many, […] whether the land is rich or poor … 
In statistics itself, exploratory data analysis was isolated. Already 
Quetelet discussed its elements (1846); actually, however, the 
introduction of isolines was a most interesting example of such 
analysis. Humboldt (1817, p. 466) invented isotherms and (much later) 
mentioned Halley who, in 1791, had shown isolines of magnetic 
declination over North Atlantic.  
That analysis belongs to the scientific method at large rather than 
mathematics and is not therefore recognized by mathematical statistics. 
It only belongs to theoretical statistics which in my opinion should 
mostly explain the difference between the two statistical sisters. Some 
authors only recognize either one or another of them. In 1953 
Kolmogorov (Anonymous 1954, p. 47), for example, declared that 
    We have for a long time cultivated a wrong belief in the existence, in 
addition to mathematical statistics and statistics as a socio-economic 
science, of something like yet another non-mathematical, although 
universal general theory of statistics which essentially comes to 
mathematical statistics and some technical methods of collecting and 
treating statistical data. Accordingly, mathematical statistics was 
declared a part of this general theory of statistics. Such views […] are 
wrong. […] 
    All that which is common in the statistical methodology of the 
natural and social sciences, all that which is here indifferent to the 
specific character of natural or social phenomena, belongs to […] 
mathematical statistics. 
    These technical methods indeed constitute exploratory data analysis. 
Kolmogorov & Prokhorov (1974/1977, p. 721) defined 
mathematical statistics as  
the branch of mathematics devoted to the mathematical methods for 
the systematization, analysis and use of statistical data for the drawing 
of scientific and practical inferences.  
Recall (§ 2.7) that they also defined the notion of statistical data and 
note that a similar definition of the theory of statistics had appeared in 
the beginning of the 19
th
 century (Butte 1808, p. XI): it is 
Die Wissenschaft der Kunst statistische Data zu erkennen und zu 
würdigen, solche zu sammeln und zu ordnen. 
The term mathematical statistics appeared in the mid-19
th
 century 
(Knies 1850, p. 163; Vernadsky 1852, p. 237), and even before Butte 
Schlözer (1804) mentioned the theory of statistics in the title of his 
book. He (p. 86) also illustrated the term statistics: Geschichte ist eine 
fortlaufende Statistik, und Statistik stillstehende Geschichte. 
Obodovsky (1839, p. 48) offered a similar statement: history is related 
to statistics as poetry to painting. 
Unlike Shlözer, many statisticians understood his pithy saying as a 
definition of statistics; as well we may say today: a car is a landed 
plane, and a plane, a car taken wing. Schlözer had not noticed that 
statistics ought to be compiled in a certain state or locality at differing 
periods of time and compared with each other. Indeed, this is 
extremely important so that statistics is not standing still! 
    For us, the theory of statistics essentially originated with Fisher. A 
queer episode is connected here with Chuprov’s book (1909/1959). Its 
title is Essays on the Theory of Statistics, but on p. 20 he stated that A 
clear and strict justification of the statistical science is still needed!  
The determinate theory of errors (§ 6.1) has much in common with 
both the exploratory data analysis and Fisher’s creation, the 
experimental design (a rational organization of measurements 
corrupted by random errors). However, the entire theory of errors 
seems to be the application of the statistical method to the process of 
measurement and observation in experimental science rather than a 
chapter of mathematical statistics, as it is usually maintained. Indeed, 
stellar statistics is the application of the statistical method to 
astronomy, and medical statistics is etc. Furthermore, unlike 
mathematical statistics the theory of errors cannot at all give up the 
notion of true value of a measured constant (§ 6.2).  
7.3. Penetration of the Theory of Probability into Statistics 
Hardly anyone will deny nowadays that statistics is based on the 
theory of probability, but the situation had not always been the same. 
Already Jakob Bernoulli (§ 4.1.1) firmly justified the possibility of 
applying the latter but statisticians had not at all been quick to avail 
themselves of the new opportunity. In those times, this might have 
been partially due to the unreliability of data; the main problem was 
their general treatment. Then, statistical investigations are not reduced 
to mathematical calculations; circumstances accompanying the studied 
phenomena are also important, cf. Leibniz’ opinion in § 4.1.1. Finally, 
their education did not prepare statisticians for grasping mathematical 
ideas and perhaps up to the 1870s they stubbornly held to equally 
possible cases, that is, to the theoretical probability.  
Lack of such cases meant denial of the possibility to apply 
probability theory. But forget the 1870s! In 1916 A. A. Kaufman 
(Ploshko & Eliseeva 1990, p. 133) declared that the theory of 
probability is only applicable to independent trials with constant 
probability of success and certainly only when those equally possible 
cases existed. 
    Now, Quetelet. He had introduced mean inclinations to crime and 
marriage (although not for separate groups of population), but 
somehow statisticians did not for a long time understand that mean 
values ought not to be applied to individuals. As a consequence, by the 
end of his life and after his death (1874), mathematically ignorant 
statisticians went up in arms against those inclinations and probability 
in general (Rümelin 1867/1875, p. 25): 
    Wenn mir die Statistik sagt, daß ich im Laufe des nächsten Jahres 
mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 1 zu 49 sterben, mit einer noch 
größeren Wahrscheinlichkeit schmerzliche Lücken in dem Kreis mir 
theurer Personen zu beklagen haben werde, so muß ich mich unter den 
Ernst dieser Wahrheit in Demuth beugen; wenn sie aber, auf ähnliche 
Durchschnittszahlen gestützt, mir sagen wollte, daß mit einer 
Wahrscheinlichkeit von 1 zu so und so viel [I shall commit a crime] so 
dürfte ich ihr unbedenklich antworten: ne sutor ultra crepidam! 
[Cobbler! Stick to your last!].  
    A healthy man could have just as well rejected the conclusions 
drawn from a life table (Chuprov 1909/1959, pp. 211– 212). 
    Lexis infused a fresh spirit into (population) statistics. His followers, 
Bortkiewicz, Chuprov, Bohlmann, Markov, founded the so-called 
continental direction of statistics. In England, Galton, and Pearson 
somewhat later created the Biometric school which had been 
statistically studying Darwinism. The editors of its journal, Biometrika, 
a Journal for the Statistical Study of Biological Problems, were 
Weldon (a biologist who died in 1906), Pearson and Davenport (an 
author of a book on biometry and several articles) in consultation with 
Galton. Here is its Editorial published in 1902, in the first issue of that 
journal:  
    The problem of evolution is a problem in statistics. […] We must 
turn to the mathematics of large numbers, to the theory of mass 
phenomena, to interpret safely our observations. […] May we not ask 
how it came about that the founder of our modern theory of descent 
made so little appeal to statistics? […] The characteristic bent of 
Darwin’s mind led him to establish the theory of descent without 
mathematical conceptions; even so Faraday’s mind worked in the case 
of electro-magnetism. But as every idea of Faraday allows of 
mathematical definition, and demands mathematical analysis, […] so 
every idea of Darwin – variation, natural selection […] – seems at 
once to fit itself to mathematical definition and to demand statistical 
analysis. […] The biologist, the mathematician and the statistician 
have hitherto had widely differentiated field of work. […] The day will 
come […] when we shall find mathematicians who are competent 
biologists, and biologists who are competent mathematicians …  
During many years the Biometric school had been keeping to 
empiricism (Chuprov 1918 – 1919, t. 2, pp. 132 – 133) and he and 
Fisher (1922, pp. 311 and 329n) both indicated that Pearson confused 
theoretical and empirical indicators. And here is Kolmogorov (1947, p. 
63; 1948/2002, p. 68): 
The modern period in the development of mathematical statistics 
began with the fundamental works of […] Pearson, Student, Fisher 
[…]. Only in the contributions of the English school did the 
application of probability theory to statistics cease to be a collection 
of separate isolated problems and become a general theory of 
statistical testing of stochastic hypotheses (of hypotheses about laws of 
distribution) and of statistical estimation of parameters of these laws.  
 
The main weakness of the [Biometric] school [in 1912] were: 1. 
Rigorous results on the proximity of empirical sample characteristics 
to the theoretical ones existed only for independent trials. 2. Notions of 
the logical structure of the theory of probability, which underlies all 
the methods of mathematical statistics, remained at the level of 
eighteenth century results. 3. In spite of the immense work of 
compiling statistical tables […], in the intermediate cases between 
‘small’ and ‘large’ samples their auxiliary techniques proved highly 
imperfect. 
I (2010) have collected many pronouncements about the Biometric 
school and Pearson; hardly known outside Russia was Bernstein’s high 
opinion. I note that Kolmogorov passed over in silence the Continental 
direction of statistics. Chuprov had exerted serious efforts for bringing 
together that Continental direction and the Biometric school, but I am 
not sure that he had attained real success. And this I say in spite of the 
Resolution of condolence passed by the Royal Statistical Society after 
the death of its Honorary member (Sheynin 1990/2011, p. 156). It 
stated that Chuprov’s contributions (not special efforts!) did much to 
harmonize the methods of statistical research developed by continental 
and British workers. Even much later Bauer (1955, p. 26) reported that 
he had investigated how both schools had been applying analysis of 
variance and concluded (p. 40) that their work was going on side by 
side but did not tend to unification.  
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